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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate three design issues in experimental auctions:  
1) the effects of allowing negative bids for a privately valued good, 2) the effects of introducing 
additional alternatives (substitutes) for the auctioned good in an endowment auction, and 3) 
respondent behavior in acquiring information. The thesis consists of three papers examining 
those issues.  
The first paper examines participants’ bidding behavior when negative bids are allowed 
for privately valued goods in an experimental auction. We focus on two questions: i) whether 
subjects with negative values tend to bid strategically – either overbidding or underbidding in an 
effort to enhancing earnings, and ii) the performance of random nth and 5th price auctions. We 
find that: a) WTP bids are demand revealing, b) subjects tend to underbid WTA values, c) 
controlling for risk attitude partially explains the bias in WTA bids, and d) negative values from 
random nth auctions tend to be below those from 5th price auctions. 
In the second paper we 1) investigate the effect of the availability of varying numbers of 
alternatives (substitutes) for a privately valued good on participants’ bidding behavior, and 2) 
identify whether the availability of additional alternatives: a) impacts the value of product 
information, and b) impacts the effect of new information on product valuations. We find that: a) 
allowing additional alternatives in a private value auction does not significantly decrease subjects’ 
bids, and b) the presence of additional alternatives in the auction decreases both the value and 
effect of product information. 
The third paper examines the effect of acquired information on auction participants’ 
bidding behavior. We focus on three questions: i) how subjects choose/value different types of 
information, ii) whether the value of acquired information about a product influences the 
  
subsequent valuation of the product itself, and iii) whether the effects of acquired information 
differ from those of exogenously provided information. We find that: a) subjects’ behaviors of 
acquiring different types of information about the product are influenced by their heterogeneous 
characteristics (i.e. prior beliefs, risk attitudes, prior knowledge, etc.), b) subjects place more 
weight on acquired information than on provided information in their decision-making process, 
and c) individual subjects have different values of information which caused different impacts on 
product valuation.  
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differ from those of exogenously provided information. We find that: a) subjects’ behaviors of 
acquiring different types of information about the product are influenced by their heterogeneous 
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Chapter 1 - General Introduction 
 
An experimental auction is a mechanism for eliciting consumers’ willingness to pay 
(WTP) and/or willingness to accept (WTA) for new products and product attributes using non-
hypothetical and incentive compatible mechanisms1. Experimental auctions are often preferred 
over alternative hypothetical valuation methods (e.g. conjoint analysis, contingent valuation) 
because they can better replicate some of the elements of a realistic market environment. 
Experiments can create realistic market environments using an appropriate experimental design 
and by employing an exchange mechanism with real products and real money to elicit subjects’ 
own reservation price for an auctioned product. A well-developed or reality-based experimental 
design will thus be important since it can provide real economic incentives to auction 
participants to reveal their true valuation for a good.  
Experimental scientists also implicitly assume the same decision-making behaviors in 
both a controlled environment and real market. Given this premise, they predict overall 
consumers’ actual behaviors outside the laboratory by extrapolating from controlled small scale 
experiments. Better predictions of field phenomena are thus likely to result from an environment 
with more realistic experimental controls. Results confounded by a lack of experimental control 
from design incentives may cause a behavioral inconsistency in the experiment and predictions 
about the real market would be less instructive. 
                                                 
1 An experimental auction is said to be incentive compatible when it induces a bidder to submit their true valuation 
for a good (Lusk and Shogren, 2007). 
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To develop a good experimental design, experimental practitioners should initially learn 
about individual’s decision making process based on economic theory and reflect those 
theoretical behavior implications in designing the experiment. Practitioners also need to examine 
the consistency between theoretical prediction from the experimental design and actual behaviors 
in the real market prior to generalizing the design. 
Some experimental design issues have been examined and debated (i.e. learning vs bid 
affiliation; endowment vs full bidding; choice of auction mechanism, use of cheap-talk scripts, 
etc.). Multiple rounds of auction trials with price feedback have been commonly utilized in 
experimental valuation studies (e.g. Fox et al., 1998; Lusk et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2011). 
Repeated bidding rounds for the same product help participants find their true values for the 
good (List and Shogren, 1999). However, price feedback may send a strong signal to participants 
who submit low bids and cause bid affiliation.2 Auction mechanisms with bid affiliation are no 
longer demand revealing in a private value auction (Harrison et al., 2004). Practitioners have yet 
to reach a clear agreement about this design issue. Harrison et al (2004) recommended using only 
one bidding round to avoid bid affiliation but this approach requires many practice auctions with 
other products to reduce subjects’ misperceptions (Plott and Zeiler, 2005). Alfnes et al (2008) 
suggested using an nth price auction with a low numbers of rounds to reduce the bid affiliation 
from price feedback.  
There are two approaches to using experimental auctions to elicit consumers’ valuation 
for a good (i.e., the endowment and full bidding approaches). In the endowment approach, a 
participant is endowed with one product and submits a bid for another product, while in the full 
                                                 
2 Bidders who have low bids are likely to submit high bids according to the price feedback. For example, a posted 
high bid submitted by one participant leads other participants who have low bids to submit higher bids in later 
rounds.  
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bidding approach a participant submits simultaneous bids for multiple products. Lusk and 
Shogren (2007) recommended the endowment approach if outside options are available for the 
auctioned product since the difference in value between two products is not confounded by the 
availability of field substitutes. On the other hand, Alfnes (2009) concluded that field substitutes 
have a significant impact on optimal bids in all private value auctions and thus the existence of 
field substitutes is not a valid reason against using the full bidding approach. He also argued that 
unequal treatment between two products (endow one product and bid for another) in the 
endowment approach may be more problematic. 
Choice of an auction mechanism (e.g. 2nd price, nth price, BDM, and random nth price 
auctions) is also an important design issues in experimental auctions because results can vary 
across different auction methods. Each mechanism has its pros and cons and they should 
theoretically yield a consistent true value. Thus, there is no clear decision rule to choose a 
specific auction mechanism. The best way of reducing the discrepancy in results from different 
auction mechanisms can be a detailed explanation of the mechanism to make sure participants 
fully understand the property of auction mechanism (Plott and Zeiler, 2005). Plott and Zeiler 
(2005) also recommended a practice auction in the experimental design since it can reduce 
subjects’ misconceptions about experimental procedures.  
There are many other design issues that already have been answered (e.g. practice or 
training) or still need to be answered (e.g. negative values, field substitutes) in the application of 
experimental auctions. Examining those design issues can explain some experimental anomalies, 
and thus improve the quality of an experimental design. This thesis will examine three design 
issues that have not been considered in detail (i.e. issues of allowing negative bids and 
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availability of field substitutes) or have never been considered (i.e. behavior in acquiring 
information). 
 
Dissertation Organization 
The primary focus of this dissertation is to examine three experimental design issues in 
private value experimental auctions, namely the impacts of 1) allowing negative bids, 2) the 
availability of market alternatives, and 3) respondent behavior in acquiring information. Each 
paper will follow a standard economic journal format. 
 
Paper 1: Bidding behavior in experimental auctions with positive and negative values 
Consumers have different perceptions about the benefits and risks of new products or 
controversial products (e.g., irradiated food or genetically modified food). Some people may 
view those products as benefits and value them positively while others may think they have 
potential risks and value them negatively. An advantage of allowing negative bids3 in an 
experimental auction is that it would permit full revelation of the demand curve. However, 
auction practitioners rarely allow negative bids due to a potential drawback – i.e., subjects may 
bid strategically instead of revealing their true valuation. The first paper in this thesis 
investigates participants’ bidding behavior when negative bids are allowed for privately valued 
goods in an experimental auction. We focus on two questions: i) whether subjects with negative 
values tend to bid strategically – either overbidding or underbidding in an effort to enhancing 
                                                 
3 If an auctioned good has a mixed preference across subjects (i.e. GM food and irradiated food), there is a chance 
that some participants have negative values for the good. In this case, they are allowed to submit negative bids in the 
experiment to give up the preferred good and obtain less preferred good (i.e. willingness to accept).   
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earnings, and ii) the performance of random nth and 5th price auctions since the choice of auction 
can attenuate or exaggerate participants’ negative reactions. 
 
Paper 2: The effects of allowing multiple alternatives on bidding behavior in a private value 
experimental auction 
The availability of substitutes is important in almost all valuation exercises since 
economic theory suggest that their availability influences demand. However, many researchers 
prefer to avoid the confounding effects from substitutes, particularly in studies where the focus is 
on valuing a specific attribute (e.g., food safety risk) whose level varies between two goods. This 
failure to control for the influence of substitutes does not reflect real world market situations and 
may lead to misinterpretation or poor predictions of consumer behavior. The second paper 
therefore investigates: i) the effect of awareness of the availability of alternatives for a privately 
valued good on participants’ bidding behavior, ii) whether the availability of additional 
alternatives decreases the value of product information, and iii) whether the availability of 
alternatives mitigates the effect of new information on product valuations. 
 
Paper 3: The effect of acquired or provided information on consumer valuation in a private 
value experimental auction 
Information has value since it can help consumers make better market choices. 
Consumers seek out the information that is of most value to them and make purchase decisions 
based on that information. Thus, the types and amounts of information that is obtained is 
endogenously decided by consumers, and depends on each consumer’s valuation of information. 
However, most experimental studies exogenously provide information to participants and then 
generally proceed to measure the effect of that information on consumers’ choices. The results 
6 
from those studies might differ from the reality of the world since they do not consider the way 
that information is acquired by consumers. The third paper therefore examines the effect of 
acquired information on auction participants’ purchasing behaviors in a private value 
experimental auction. We focus on: i) how subjects choose/value different types of information, 
ii) whether the value of acquired information about a product influences the subsequent valuation 
of the product itself, and iii) whether the effects of acquired information differ from those of 
exogenously provided information. 
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Chapter 2 - Bidding Behavior in Experimental Auctions with 
Positive and Negative Values4 
 
 2.1. Introduction 
 Due to their having a mix of perceived benefits and risks, goods such as irradiated or 
genetically modified foods are valued positively by some consumers and negatively by others. 
Mixed logit estimation with choice experiment data readily accommodates simultaneous 
estimation of positive and negative values, but the same is not true for valuation experiments. 
Experimental auctions typically elicit either a willingness to pay (WTP) or a willingness to 
accept (WTA) value, and rarely allow negative bids which would facilitate simultaneous 
elicitation of both WTP and WTA (Lusk and Shogren, 2007). Instead, when faced with the 
likelihood of negative valuations, researchers typically truncate bids at zero, or separate 
participants based on preference and elicit WTP to upgrade to a preferred alternative (Fox et al., 
1998). 
 Allowing negative bids in an experimental auction would permit full revelation of the 
demand curve. However, Dickenson and Bailey (2002) pointed to a potential drawback of 
allowing negative bids – i.e., subjects may bid strategically instead of revealing their true 
valuation. Their concern was motivated by results from induced value experiments reported by 
Shogren et al. (2002) and later by Parkhurst et al. (2004) showing that subjects with negative 
values tended to overbid (not reveal the full extent of the negative valuation) in a 2nd price 
auction. In the same study, results from a random nth price auction were less precise but did not 
reveal the same tendency to overbid negative values (Parkhurst et al., 2004). 
                                                 
4 A revised version of this chapter was published in Economics Letters 
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515003717). 
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 In this paper, we investigate participants’ bidding behavior when negative bids are 
allowed for privately valued goods in an experimental auction. We focus on two questions: i) 
whether subjects with negative values tend to bid strategically – either overbidding (as found by 
Parkhurst et al.) or underbidding (i.e., demanding excess compensation) in an effort to enhancing 
earnings, and b) the performance of random nth and 5th price auctions when negative bids are 
allowed. Any tendency to either under- or over-bid a negative value would be important to 
recognize should practitioners begin to routinely allow negative bids in their experiments. We 
find that a) WTP bids are demand revealing, b) subjects tend to underbid WTA values, c) 
controlling for risk attitude partially explains the bias in WTA bids, and d) negative values from 
random nth auctions tend to be below those from 5th price auctions. 
 
 2.2. Experimental design 
 Participants were graduate and undergraduate students at Kansas State University, 
recruited via e-mail solicitation or from an undergraduate class. They were told they would be 
paid $5 and receive a pizza meal. A total of five sessions were held, each with ten participants. 
Two sessions used a 5th price auction, two used a random nth price auction, and one session used 
both auctions. The experiment thus provided 30 observations for each auction mechanism. 
 On arrival, participants signed a consent form, received the $5 payment, were provided 
with an ID number, and completed a short questionnaire. In stage 1, participants examined two 
products – a 10oz package of Trail Mix (TM) and a 6oz package of Dried Fruit (DF). They were 
then asked to indicate a preference - i.e., I prefer the Trail Mix; I prefer the Dried Fruit; I like 
them both equally well. Participants were then told that they would participate in a 2nd price 
auction for both products. A practice auction using a small candy bar was used to demonstrate 
10 
the auction mechanism and to emphasize that the exercise was not hypothetical. At the end of the 
practice auction, the winning bidder obtained the candy bar and paid, in cash, an amount equal to 
the 2nd highest bid. Participants then bid for the packages of TM and DF in a “full bidding 
approach” with bids for both items were submitted simultaneously (Corrigan and Rousu, 2006). 
To avoid a wealth effect, participants were told that only one of the two auctions, selected by 
coin toss, would be binding. They were informed that the binding auction and winning bidder 
would be selected at the conclusion of the experiment.  
 In stage 2, participants were told that they would participate in a number of “endowment” 
auctions in which they would bid either a positive WTP or a negative WTA to exchange one 
good for another. Only one of these auctions (the number of auctions was not revealed) would be 
binding, and there would be N-1 winning bidders each paying an amount equal to the Nth bid. In 
sessions using the 5th price auction, N=5 was revealed prior to bidding. In sessions using the 
random nth auction participants were told that N would be a randomly drawn number between 2 
and 8, determined after the bidding. An instruction sheet illustrated how the auction would work 
in a scenario with seven subjects bidding to exchange an oven mitt for a coffee mug. In that 
scenario, three people preferred the coffee mug (and bid positive WTP for the exchange), one 
was indifferent (and bid zero), and three preferred the oven mitt (and bid negative WTA for the 
exchange). Positive, zero, and negative bids were illustrated as points along a line. With N=5 
winning bidders, the result was 4 bidders making the exchange and getting paid the amount of 
the (negative) 5th highest bid to do so. To ensure that subjects understood the mechanism, they 
were asked a series of questions about the scenario – e.g., what would happen if N=2, etc. To 
further familiarize them with the auction, another practice auction (also binding) was conducted 
using candy bars.  
11 
 We then conducted Auction A, in which participants were endowed with a package of DF 
and could bid to exchange it for a package of TM. On the bid sheet, participants were asked to 
write “the most I am willing to pay” for the exchange or “the minimum I would accept” to make 
the exchange, and were further instructed to mark their bid along a line. The monitor checked bid 
sheets for consistency between the written bid amount and the location of the marked bid on the 
line and sought clarification from the subject in the event of any discrepancy. After bids were 
collected, participants handed back the DF and proceeded to Auction B in which the endowment 
was reversed, i.e., the endowment was TM and participants bid to exchange it for DF.5  
 In our analysis, performance of the subsequent endowment auctions will be assessed in 
terms of consistency between the initial bid differential between the two products in stage 1, and 
bids for upgrades or downgrades in stage 2. 
 
 2.3. Experimental results 
 After checking the data for consistency between initial bids and stated preferences, bids 
from three subjects (all from the session using both auction types) were discarded for 
inconsistency i.e., stating a preference for good A, but simultaneously submitting a larger bid for 
good B. Table 2-1 summarizes the bids for the remaining 27 observations on each auction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Two additional rounds, C and D, were conducted in the session that used both auction types. 
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 Table 2-1. Stage 1 and Stage 2 bids by auction type 
Auction type Stage 1 Stage 2 
Bid for TM Bid for DF DFTM TMDF 
5th price 
(N=27) 
Mean 1.58 1.47 0.03 -0.54 
Median 1.25 1.00 0.1 -0.6 
St. Dev. 1.04 1.19 1.09 1.70 
Random nth 
(N=27) 
Mean 1.74 1.62 -0.35 -0.28 
Median 1.8 1.5 0.00 0.00 
St. Dev. 1.13 1.33 1.65 2.00 
 
Stage 1 bids are slightly higher for Trail Mix (TM) than for Dried Fruit (DF) but the 
difference is not significant (p = 0.43)6. Stage1 bids suggest that the expected average bid for the 
DFTM exchange in Stage2 should be $0.11 and $0.12 in the 5th and random nth auctions 
respectively. The observed DF  TM averages are lower, insignificantly in the 5th price ($0.03, 
p=0.58), but significantly lower in the random nth (-$0.35, p=0.01). For the opposite TMDF 
exchange, average bids in the 5th and random nth auctions (-$0.54 and -$0.28) are again below the 
expected -$0.11 and -$0.12, but the differences are not significant (p=0.19, p=0.49). The average 
bid for the DFTM exchange is higher in the 5th price auction, while that for the TMDF 
exchange is higher in the random nth auction. 
Comparing Stage 2 bids in the 5th price and random nth auctions reveals no clear pattern. 
The average bid for the DFTM exchange is higher in the 5th price auction, while the average 
bid for the opposite TMDF exchange is highest in the random nth auction. Bid variance is 
higher in the random nth auctions, but again, differences are not statistically significant.  
                                                 
6 All p-values show paired t-test results. 
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We now re-categorize Stage 2 bids as either WTP or WTA values according to the 
preference revealed in Stage 1.7 In table 2-2, “Upgrade WTP” represents WTP to exchange to the 
preferred alternative (whether DF or TM), and, similarly, “Downgrade WTA” represents the 
negative WTP for an exchange toward the less preferred alternative. The “Stage 1 Premium” is 
the premium for the preferred alternative revealed in Stage 1.   
Table 2-2. Stage 1 premium, Upgrade WTP, and Downgrade WTA values, by auction type 
Auction type Stage 1 Premium 
 
Upgrade 
WTP 
Downgrade 
WTA 
5th price 
(N=27) 
Mean 0.69 0.74 -1.25 
Median 0.50 0.50 -1.00 
St. Dev. 0.71 0.85 1.22 
Random nth 
(N=26) 
Mean 0.93 0.95 -1.61 
Median 0.75 0.75 -1.30 
St. Dev. 0.77 1.16 1.49 
 
 Table 2-2 values suggest that upgrade WTP is similar to the Stage 1 premium, while 
downgrade WTA values exceed (in absolute value) the Stage 1 premium. Among 53 pairs of 
DFTM, TMDF bids, we found 16 that could be classified8 as exhibiting WTA>>WTP, but 
only 3 where WTP>>WTA. We test the hypothesis of demand revealing bidding behavior in the 
Stage 2 auctions using the following structure: 
(1) WTPi (WTAi) = α + β*PREMi + εi 
                                                 
7 One subject indicated equal preference for TM and DF, bid equal amounts for both products, and bid zero WTP 
and WTA amounts in Stage 2. Because the Stage 2 bids could not be categorized as either WTP or WTA, the 
individual’s bids were dropped from this analysis. 
8 Classifying WTA>>WTP if the absolute value of the negative bid is at least twice the value of the positive bid, or 
is at least $1 more than the positive bid. 
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where WTPi (WTAi) is the Stage 2 bid to upgrade (downgrade), and PREMi is the premium for 
the preferred good from Stage 1. Stage 2 bids are demand revealing if α=0 and β=1 for WTP, 
and α=0 and β=-1 for WTA. The estimated WTP/WTA equations for each auction, with 
standard errors in parentheses, are: 
 5th Price: WTPi = 0.19  +  0.81*PREMi     (W = 0.64; p = 0.53) 
    (0.17)    (0.18) 
   WTAi = -0.75  -  0.73*PREMi             (W = 3.73; p = 0.038) 
    (0.31)    (0.32) 
 Random N: WTPi = 0.11  +  0.91*PREMi              (W = 0.08; p = 0.92) 
    (0.29)    (0.24) 
   WTAi = -0.36  -  1.35*PREMi              (W = 5.98; p = 0.008) 
    (0.33)    (0.28) 
 The Wald test values (W) test the joint hypothesis α=0 and β=1/-1 and indicate that, for 
both WTP auctions, the hypothesis of demand revealing bidding cannot be rejected. For both 
WTA auctions however, demand revealing bidding is rejected. WTA coefficient estimates 
indicate that participants demand more compensation to surrender the preferred good in 
exchange for the less preferred good than they are willing to pay for the opposite exchange. 
Divergence between elicited WTP and WTA is common in experimental valuation and is 
consistent with an endowment effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). From table 2-2 we see that 
in the 5th price auction, WTA bids exceed their WTP counterparts by 0.51 on average 
(WTP=0.74, WTA = -1.25), while in the random nth treatment the difference was 0.66. 
 We now explore whether the subject’s attitude to risk may have a role in explaining the 
WTA bids. Since the endowment effect posits the idea that losses are weighted more heavily 
than gains in the utility function, it seems possible that the weighting applied to losses may be 
correlated with an individual’s risk attitude. Thus, individuals who are more risk averse may be 
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more inclined to exaggerate a WTA bid (i.e., demand more compensation) to reduce the 
possibility of losing a preferred good. Our questionnaire elicited risk attitude by asking 
respondents the degree to which they disagreed/agreed with the statement “I am cautious in 
trying new and different things.” Responses were on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
5 (strongly agree), with higher values indicate higher risk aversion. The variable had a mean of 
2.85 and St. Dev. 0.91. Including risk attitude in the WTA models provides the following 
estimates: 
 5th Price:   WTAi = -0.34 - 0.78*PREMi - 0.12*Riski      (W = 0.21; p = 0.81) 
         (0.87)  (0.34)              (0.24) 
 Random N:  WTAi = 0.01 - 1.35*PREMi - 0.14*Riski     (W = 0.88; p = 0.43) 
         (0.81)  (0.28)               (0.27) 
 In both models, the coefficient on risk attitude is negative (as hypothesized) but not 
statistically significant. The coefficients on the first stage premium (PREM) are similar to the 
earlier estimates, but in both cases the intercept moves closer to the origin. With that change, the 
joint hypothesis that α=0 and β=-1 is not rejected for either model.  
 The final objective is to compare performance of the 5th price and random nth price 
auctions. For subjects with large positive or negative values, Parkhurst et al. (2004) found that 
subjects in a 2nd price auction tended to overbid while bids in the random nth auction were 
unbiased. We investigate the hypothesis of similar behavior across auction mechanisms using:  
(2) WTPi (WTAi) = α1 + β1*PREMi + α2*RandomN + β2*PREM*RandomN + εi 
where RandomN is a dummy variable for bids elicited in a random nth auction, and 
PREM*RandomN an interaction term. Bidding behavior is similar in both auctions if α2 and β2 
are both zero. The estimated equations are: 
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WTPi = 0.19 + 0.81*PREMi – 0.07*RandomN + 0.09 PREM*RandomN   (W=0.05; p=0.95) 
(0.21) (0.22)             (0.33)                  (0.31) 
WTAi = -0.75 - 0.73*PREMi + 0.39*RandomN - 0.63 PREM*RandomN    (W=1.16; p=0.32) 
(0.30) (0.31)             (0.46)                  (0.42) 
Wald tests for the joint hypothesis fails to reject similar bidding behavior in the two 
auction mechanisms for both positive (WTP) and negative (WTA) values. However, while the 
estimated α2 and β2 coefficients are both close to zero in the WTP equation, they are of 
considerably greater magnitude in the WTA equation. Figures 2-1 and 2-2 plot WTP and WTA 
bids against the stage 1 premium. Figure 2-2 shows that WTA bids elicited with the random nth 
auction are everywhere below the stage 1 premium, and that divergence from both the stage 1 
premium and 5th price auction values increases with the stage 1 premium.   
Figure 2-1. WTP bids vs Stage 1 Premium    
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Figure 2-2. WTA bids vs Stage 1 Premium  
 
 
 2.4. Conclusions 
 Valuation studies often deal with goods for which some subjects hold positive value, 
others negative. In that context, experimental auctions that permit simultaneous elicitation of 
positive and negative values have advantages over other approaches such as truncation at zero, or 
screening and separating subjects based on preferences. Permitting negative bids allows for a 
more complete revelation of the demand curve, but may also introduce incentives for strategic 
bidding for subjects seeking a financial gain. Using an approach that compares values elicited in 
an endowment auction (Stage 2) that permits negative bids with values from prior “full-bidding” 
auctions (Stage 1) for the same two private goods, we show that allowing negative bids did not 
compromise accurate revelation of positive WTP values in either a 5th price or random nth 
auction mechanism. 
 As in many studies, we find evidence of a WTP/WTA divergence, with WTA exceeding 
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WTA bids accurately revealed demand was rejected. Controlling for the subject’s risk attitude 
was shown to partially explain the overbidding of WTA. The random nth and 5th price auctions 
performed similarly in eliciting WTP values; with negative values, however, the tendency to 
overbid (in absolute value) was more pronounced with the random nth price mechanism, a 
finding similar to Lusk et al. (2004). Our findings are in contrast with those of Parkhurst et al. 
(2004) who reported demand revealing bidding in a repeated trial random nth auction for both 
positive and negative induced values. We find no reason to discourage practitioners from 
allowing simultaneous positive/negative bidding in valuation experiments, but our results 
suggest that negative bids will reflect the commonly found WTP/WTA disparity, and that it may 
be more pronounced in a random nth auction. 
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Chapter 3 - The Effects of Allowing Multiple Alternatives on 
Bidding Behavior in a Private Value Experimental Auction 
 
 3.1. Introduction 
 Laboratory experimental auctions are a popular method for estimating values of new 
products and product attributes. Examples include valuation studies for new products (Fox et al., 
1994; Hoffman et al., 1993), food safety (Fox et al., 2002; Hayes et al., 1995; Dickinson and 
Bailey, 2002; Hobbs et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2011), and food attributes (Lusk et al., 2001; Feuz et 
al., 2004; Melton et al., 1996). Experimental auctions have also been used to test economic 
theory such as investigations of the willingness to pay/willingness to accept disparity (Shogren et 
al., 1994; Plott and Zeiler, 2005), and preference reversals (List, 2002). 
 Experimental auctions that are non-hypothetical and that employ incentive compatible 
auction mechanisms are often preferred over hypothetical survey valuation methods because they 
can better replicate some features of a realistic market environment (Lusk, 2003). Carefully 
designed experiments that provide appropriate incentives for demand revelation may therefore 
provide more accurate predictions of consumer market behavior compared to hypothetical 
surveys. However, to the extent that an experimental design may fail to account for relevant 
features of the actual market setting that it seeks to replicate its predictions of consumer behavior 
in that market can be biased (Corrigan, 2005; Harrison, 1992). One such feature that has received 
somewhat limited attention in the experimental valuation literature is the availability of 
substitutes for the good or the attribute being valued.    
 The presence or absence of substitutes is potentially important in valuation since 
economic theory suggest that their availability influences demand for a good. However, many if 
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not most laboratory valuation studies have not explicitly accounted for field substitutes. This is 
particularly true in studies where the focus is on valuing a specific attribute (e.g., food safety 
risk) whose level varies between two goods (Rousu et al., 2008). Previous studies (e.g., Cherry et 
al., 2004; Harrison et al., 2004; Corrigan, 2005; Alfnes, 2009) have demonstrated that auction 
participants take field substitutes into account when they formulate bids.  Thus, allowing for 
substitutes is one of the ways in which experimental valuation environments can be made more 
realistic.   
 However, the goal of realistically accounting for the availability of substitutes while at 
the same time preserving the incentives for participants to accurately reveal demand for the 
good(s) being valued poses some problems for the experimenter.  In particular, if participants are 
allowed to bid for multiple goods there is the question of which good will ultimately be 
purchased.  In an actual market setting it is, of course, the consumer who decides.  But in an 
experimental auction, if the participant can decide which one of the multiple goods being valued 
they will purchase they will not have an incentive to accurately reveal their willingness-to-pay 
(i.e., demand) for the remaining alternatives.  The basic problem of course is simply the fact that 
the position (or height) of the demand curve for any good depends on the price of its substitutes.  
Thus, one approach for accounting for substitutes is simply to inform experimental participants 
about the price of a substitute – be that substitute available within the experiment or in an outside 
market.  The values obtained in that setting therefore reflect the provided price or prices of the 
substitute(s).  A second approach, and the one we take here, is to simultaneously elicit value for 
multiple goods each of which can be considered substitutes for the other.  The catch however, is 
that we do not allow the participant to choose which good is ultimately purchased.  Instead, the 
good to be sold in the auction is determined via a random draw.  Given that design mechanism, 
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i.e., the fact that the participant does not get to choose from among the substitutes, we cannot 
claim that our elicited values reflect the presence of substitutes – but they do at a minimum 
reflect participant awareness of the fact that substitutes exist and are potentially available, an 
awareness that is not explicitly accounted for in studies that do not include substitutes.  
Henceforth in the paper therefore (and in its title) we refer to our design as one that examines the 
effects of “alternatives” for the auctioned good rather than claiming that those alternatives are 
“substitutes” in the economic sense. 
 As noted, some previous studies have verified the influence of outside substitutes in 
experimental auctions. However, some important questions remain. First, does mere awareness 
of the availability of substitutes affect participants’ bidding behaviors in a private value 
experimental auction?  If so, does the measured impact have implications for designing valuation 
experiments?  Second, does the availability of multiple alternatives influence participants’ 
incentives to obtain new information about a good being valued, and, once obtained, how bids 
for the good respond to that new information?  Examining information effects has become 
routine in experimental auctions. Many studies have identified that auction participants 
sensitively respond to information provided to them but no study has investigated whether the 
presence of substitutes may mitigate or amplify the effect of new information (Fox et al., 2002; 
Corrigan et al., 2009; Tegene et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2011). Thus, another important question is 
whether new information has the same impact on participants’ bids as more alternative for the 
good being valued are made available? Answering these questions has potentially significant 
implications for the design of valuation experiments, particularly when we consider that the 
typical goal of a small scale valuation experiment is to predict consumer behavior in the broader 
market setting.   
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 The objectives of this study are therefore 1) to investigate the effect of awareness of the 
potential availability of alternatives for a privately valued good (a beef burger) on participants’ 
bidding behavior, and 2) to identify whether the presence of additional alternatives will: a) 
decrease the value of product information, and b) mitigate the effect of new information on 
product valuations. We especially focus on whether subjects in a valuation setting with multiple 
alternatives tend to bid differently compared to those in an environment with only one alternative 
(as is typical in many endowment type auctions). Theory suggests that the availability of 
additional substitutes should result in lower bids, but, as noted, our experimental design mitigates 
the substitution effect given that participants cannot freely choose which of the alternative goods 
they may end up consuming.  But our design does assess awareness of substitutes and to the 
extent that mere awareness of substitutes can impact values the impact is important to recognize 
and to quantify. Ideally, that quantification might also provide a starting point for the calibration 
of elicited values from settings that do not (or cannot) include substitutes. 
 
 3.2. Experimental Design 
 A total of 112 consumers participated in our experiments in which the object of valuation 
was reduced food safety risk. In particular, we chose a beef burger as the auctioned good since 
most participants are familiar with the product and should have little difficulty placing a value on 
it.  Our subjects were endowed with a “regular” beef burger and could bid to upgrade to an 
irradiated beef burger described as having a lower risk of bacterial contamination. Our design 
includes three treatments that each differ in the availability of alternatives for the irradiated 
burger. Those alternatives included a beef burger from cattle treated with direct-fed microbials 
(DFM burger), a high pressure processed beef burger (HPP burger), and a chicken sandwich. 
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Each treatment was conducted with four groups, with each group consisting of between 7 and 12 
participants.  
 We recruited participants from four different sources. Forty subjects were recruited from 
respondents to a mail survey which was conducted in two cities about a month prior to the 
experimental auction (18 from one, 22 from the other).  An additional 14 participants were 
recruited using either random digit dialing from the phone book in one city and from among the 
members of a standing taste testing panel in the other city.  Those 54 participants were assigned 
to six groups – one for each of the three treatments in both cities.  Twenty-eight subjects were 
recruited from the membership of the parent-teacher association of an elementary school.  They 
were assigned to three groups, one group per treatment.  Finally, thirty subjects were recruited 
from two undergraduate classes and were similarly assigned to three groups, one per treatment.  
Thus, while the sample was recruited from different sources, those sources were equally 
represented across the three treatments.  Participants were not informed about the nature of the 
experiment but were screened to exclude non meat eaters. 
 On arrival, participants signed a consent form and were paid their participation fee.9 They 
were provided with an ID number and asked to complete a questionnaire. On completing the 
questionnaire, the 4th price endowment auction was explained by the moderator.  Subjects were 
explicitly informed that their best strategy was to bid an amount equal to their true valuation for 
the exchange of one good for another. A practice auction using candy bars was conducted to help 
participants understand the procedure and to emphasize that an actual monetary exchange would 
take place at the conclusion – i.e., the experiment was not hypothetical.   
                                                 
9 Undergraduates were paid $20 each.  Members of the PTA group received $30 each but had agreed beforehand to 
donate their participation fee to the PTA.  All other subjects were paid $50. 
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 Following the practice auction, subjects were told that they would participate in a number 
of 4th price auctions (the number of auctions was not revealed). They were also informed that the 
binding auction (hereafter referred to as round) and product to be sold in that binding round 
would be determined using a random draw at the end of experiment. Each treatment included 
four auction rounds. In Treatment 1, participants bid to exchange a “regular” beef burger for an 
“irradiated” burger in each of the first three bidding rounds. In each successive round they were 
provided with additional information about irradiation. Round 4 introduced an additional 
substitute, allowing participant to bid for both an “irradiated” and a “DFM” burger. Treatments 2 
and 3 were similar but featured additional products. In Treatment 2, participants bid for both the 
“irradiated” and “DFM” burgers in the first three rounds, with round 4 introducing a “HPP” 
burger as an additional alternative. In Treatment 3, all three alternative burgers (irradiated, DFM, 
and HPP burgers) were available in the first three rounds, with round 4 introducing a chicken 
sandwich as an additional alternative.  Following Lee and Fox (2015) the experiment permitted 
negative bids since each of the available alternatives could potentially be viewed as either 
superior or inferior to the endowed “regular” burger. The experiment also included a requirement 
that participants consume one burger at the end of the exercise – either the regular burger or the 
alternative acquired by way of the auction.  Participants were provided with a brief description of 
food irradiation before bidding in the first round in treatment 1.  Descriptions of both food 
irradiation and direct-fed microbials were provided in treatment 2, while participants in treatment 
3 also received a description of high-pressure processing (see Appendix A for the descriptions 
provided).  
 Prior to the 2nd bidding round in each treatment we conducted a separate BDM auction in 
which participants could bid for additional information about food irradiation. Two types of 
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information were made available - one positive, focusing on the benefits of irradiation and the 
other negative, focusing on potential risks of irradiation (see Appendix 2).  Subjects were 
allowed to bid for just one type of information, not both.10 The price for information was 
determined in a random draw from an envelope containing 25 price tickets (the price distribution 
was not revealed to participants). Winning bidders were asked to read the information they 
acquired before bidding for the irradiated hamburger (and the alternative products) in round 2. 
Prior to round 3, all participants were provided, free of charge, the information they had not 
already acquired. Thus, if they had already acquired the positive information they were given the 
negative information and vice-versa. If they had not acquired either they were given both types 
of information. When bidding in round 3 and 4 therefore, all participants had obtained the same 
sets of information about food irradiation. 
 
 3.3. Experimental Results 
 Summary statistics for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of our sample are 
provided in table 3-1.  Average age was approximately 39 years old and the sample was evenly 
balanced between males and females.  Almost all participants were either in college or had a 
college degree and over three quarters indicated that they purchased ground beef or hamburger 
once a week.  Average prior knowledge of food irradiation was 1.8 on a 1 to 5 scale from 1= 
“nothing” to 5= “a great deal” indicating that the process was largely unfamiliar to participants.  
However, when asked about the acceptability of using food irradiation the average response was 
around 3.5 on a scale of 1= “totally unacceptable” to 5= “perfectly acceptable” suggesting that, 
on average, the process was viewed as somewhat acceptable.   
                                                 
10 Our objective was two-fold; a) to force participants to reveal which of the two types of information they preferred 
to obtain and b) to ensure that each participant at most acquired just one type of information prior to the next bid.   
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Table 3-1. Sample Characteristics (n=112) 
Variable Categories Mean Std. Dev. 
Age Years 38.9 4.27 
Household size Persons  3.14 1.51 
Gender Male 48% 
Female 52% 
Family income Less than $40,000 17.8% 
$40,001 - $100,000 43.7% 
More than $100,001 38.3% 
Education level High school graduate 0.9% 
College graduate 61.6% 
Graduate degree 37.5% 
Frequency1 At least once a week 77.6% 
2-3 times a month 12.5% 
About once a month 8% 
Less than once a month 1.8% 
Concern2 1: Not at all concerned - 5: Very concerned 3.27 1.25 
Prior knowledge3 1: Nothing – 5: A great deal 1.8 0.96 
Acceptance4 1: Totally unacceptable – 5: Perfectly acceptable 3.48 1.18 
1 Frequency of buying Ground beef/Hamburger 
2 Safety concern of Ground beef/Hamburger 
3 Prior knowledge about Food irradiation 
4 Level of acceptance of using irradiation in meat processing 
 
Objective 1: Effect of additional alternatives on valuations  
 Table 3-2 describes the distributions of bids across each round in each of the three 
treatments.  We can examine the effect of introducing additional alternatives both across and 
within treatments.  Focusing first on the first round (R1) bids for the irradiated burger we 
observe that the average bid tends to decrease with the availability of additional alternatives.  In 
treatment 1 the average bid for the irradiated burger is -$0.15 compared to -$0.27 in treatment 2 
and -$0.47 in treatment 3.  However, their mean differences between treatments 1 and 2 (p = 
0.31) and between treatments 1 and 3 (p = 0.16) are not statistically significant.11 In R3 and R4, 
                                                 
11 T-test was applied for mean equality tests.  
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in which all participants have obtained the additional positive and negative descriptions of food 
irradiation, the pattern across treatments is less clear.  Average bids in treatment 3 are below 
those in treatment 1 but bids in treatment 2 are higher.  For the DFM burger we observe lower 
average bids in treatment 3 compared to treatment 2.  In R1 for example, the average bid for the 
DFM burger is -$0.02 in treatment 2 compared to -$0.07 in treatment 3 but again the difference 
is not significant.  For the HPP burger the only cross treatment comparison available is in the R4 
bid where again the bid is lower but not significantly so in treatment 3 compared to treatment 2 (-
$0.05 vs -$0.19).   
Table 3-2. Bid distributions 
 Treatment 1 (N=35) Treatment 2 (N=39) Treatment 3 (N=38) 
Mean Median St. 
Dev. 
Mean Median St. 
Dev. 
Mean Median St. 
Dev. 
R1 Irradiation -0.152 0 1.384 -0.274 -0.02 0.631 -0.471 0 1.351 
DFM    -0.021 0 0.674 -0.075 0 1.071 
HPP       0.001 0 0.719 
R2 Irradiation -0.026 0 1.336 -0.208 0 0.543 -1.561 0 4.362 
DFM    -0.075 0 0.635 -0.147 0 1.797 
HPP       -0.127 0 1.724 
R3 Irradiation -1.435 -0.25 3.544 -0.480 -0.15 0.953 -1.646 0 4.325 
DFM    -0.099 0 0.663 -0.226 0 1.754 
HPP       -0.169 0 1.719 
R4 Irradiation -1.427 -0.50 3.536 -0.483 -0.15 0.952 -1.643 0 4.326 
DFM -0.105 0 1.023 -0.108 0 0.661 -0.489 0 3.315 
HPP    -0.048 0 0.552 -0.195 0 1.708 
Chicken       -0.008 0 0.344 
     
 Within-sample comparisons between R3 and R4 in each treatment also did not show a 
significant effect on the average bid of introducing an additional alternative.  For the irradiated 
burger the average bid is essentially unchanged between R3 and R4.  In treatments 1 and 2, only 
4 out of 35 participants and 1 out of 39 participants respectively decreased their bids between R3 
and R4, while nobody lowered their bid in treatment 3.  Overall, the mean change in the bid for 
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the irradiated burger between R3 and R4 was 0.003.  Similarly, there is little change in the bid 
for the DFM burger in treatment 2 but in treatment 3 its average bid falls from -$0.23 o -$0.49 
between R3 and R4.  Bids for the HPP burger also decline slightly in treatment 3 – from -$0.17 
in R3 to -$0.19 in R4.  Again however, none of these changes were statistically significant.   
 Finally, we examined the proportions of zero, positive and negative bids for an irradiated 
burger across rounds in each treatment (Figure 3-1). The first round in treatment 1 has more 
positive and zero bids than negative bids. On the other hand, subjects submitted more negative 
bids than positive and zero bids in treatment 2 and 3 as more alternatives were available. After 
providing both positive and negative information about food irradiation in R2 and R3 we observe 
an increase in the proportion of negative bids in all treatments.  But the addition of a new 
alternative in R4 results in very little change in the overall distribution of bids.  Overall, both the 
pattern of bidding and the unconditional mean equality tests indicate no significant impact 
associated with introducing additional product alternatives and we cannot reject the hypotheses 
of bid equality across treatments. 
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Figure 3-1. Percentage of zero, positive, and negative bids across rounds 
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 Unconditional tests of mean bids across treatments do not however completely reveal the 
impact of introducing additional bidding alternatives.  Individual bids and changes in bids may 
be influenced by individual characteristics and those individual characteristics are not equally 
distributed across treatments. We examine bidding behaviors at the individual level by 
estimating the conditional regression model (1) and testing for the significance of the coefficients 
𝛽1 and 𝛽2 associated with treatments 2 and 3.  Model (1) is estimated using only the R1 bids for 
an irradiated burger since these bids are not confounded by any information effects.  Model (2) is 
estimated using the R4 bids where participants have obtained both the positive and negative 
information about food irradiation.  Similarly, model (3) uses R4 bids for the DFM burger. Thus: 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐼1𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇2 + 𝛽2𝑇3 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙1𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙2𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖                                          (1) 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐼4𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇2 + 𝛽2𝑇3 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐼1𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙1𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙2𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                     (2) 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐷4𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇2 + 𝛽2𝑇3 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙1𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙2𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖                                          (3) 
where  𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐼1𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐼4𝑖 denote individual bids for an irradiated burger in round 1 and 4 
respectively; 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐷4𝑖 represents individual bids for a DFM burger in round 4; 𝑇2 and 𝑇3 are 
dummies for treatment 2 and 3; 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐼1𝑖 in model (2) controls for individual’s initial perception 
about the irradiated product; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙1𝑖 denotes control variables for general socio-demographic 
factors (gender, age, education level, annual income, and household size); 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙2𝑖 denotes 
control variables for individuals frequency of beef consumption, concern about food safety, and 
prior knowledge about food irradiation or DFM; 𝜖𝑖, 𝜀𝑖, and  𝜇𝑖 are i.i.d. components. 
 Table 3-3 provides estimates from the regression models. They indicate that, after 
controlling for individual characteristics, treatment effects are insignificant. An exception is the 
unexpected positive coefficient associated with treatment 2 in Model 2.  The coefficient estimate 
indicates that in Round 4, bids for the irradiated burger are $1.32 higher in treatment 2 than in 
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treatment 1, ceteris paribus.  The remaining treatment coefficients are statistically insignificant, 
consistent with the results from the unconditional tests. 
Table 3-3. Regression results 
 Model (1), R1 Model (2), R4 Model (3), R4 DFM 
Coefficient (Std. error) Coefficient (Std. error) Coefficient (Std. error) 
Treatment 2 0.03(0.28) 1.32(0.68)* 0.13(0.50) 
Treatment 3 -0.28(0.28) 0.09(0.67) -0.32(0.49) 
Male 0.13(0.24) 1.33(0.58)** 0.23(0.42) 
Age 0.002(0.008) 0.02(0.02) 0.001(0.01) 
Education -0.10(0.10) -0.05(0.26) 0.11(0.19) 
Household size -0.03(0.08) 0.09(0.21) 0.05(0.16) 
Income 0.09(0.05)* -0.11(0.14) 0.14(0.10) 
Frequency 0.03(0.16) 0.05(0.39) 0.21(0.28) 
Concern 0.05(0.09) -0.42(0.22)* -0.18(0.16) 
Prior knowledge 0.17(0.12) 0.06(0.29) 0.32(0.20) 
Constant -0.86(0.70) -0.86(1.67) -2.07(1.27)* 
Bid1 - 1.40(0.23)*** - 
Number of Obs. 112 112 112 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
(  ) represents standard error. 
 
 To this point our estimated models utilize bids from single rounds of bidding and do not 
consider the panel nature of the bidding data. Therefore, we further analyze the effect of 
additional alternatives on bids by estimating the following random effects regression models 
using bids from multiple rounds: 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇2 + 𝛽2𝑇3 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑅 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑅 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙1𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙2𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑅                                                    (4) 
𝐵𝑖𝑑34𝑖𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑆𝑢𝑏 + 𝛽2𝑇2 + 𝛽3𝑇3 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑖𝑑1𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙1𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙2𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑅             (5) 
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where 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑅 is an individual’s bid for an irradiated burger in round R; 𝐵𝑖𝑑34𝑖𝑅 denotes an 
individual’s bid in round 3 or 4; 𝑇2 and 𝑇3 are dummies for treatment 2 and 3; 𝐷𝑆𝑢𝑏 is a 
dummy variable denoting the availability of an additional alternative in round 4 (i.e. 𝐷𝑆𝑢𝑏 = 1 if 
bids are in R4); 𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑅 is a dummy variable indicating that the individual had positive 
information in round R; 𝐷𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑅 is a dummy indicating that an individual had negative 
information in round R; 𝐷𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖 is a dummy for an individual who received negative 
information first and positive information later; 𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑖 is dummy for an individual who 
received positive information first and negative information later; 𝐵𝑖𝑑1𝑖 is the individual’s bid in 
round 1 which control for initial perceptions about the irradiated product; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙1𝑖 denotes 
control variables for socio-demographic factors (gender, age, education level, annual income, 
and household size); 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙2𝑖 denotes control variables for frequency of beef consumption, 
concern for food safety, and prior knowledge about food irradiation; 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 are random effects 
which control for unobservable individual characteristics; 𝜖𝑖𝑅 and 𝜀𝑖𝑅 are i.i.d. components.  We 
test whether 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are negative for cross-treatment comparisons in model (4) and test 
whether 𝛽1 is negative for within-samples comparisons in model (5). 
 Table 3-4 provides estimation results from equations (4) and (5). Again, the results show 
no significant effect of additional substitutes on bidding behavior - either across treatments or 
within samples.  In model (4) the coefficient for treatment 2 is positive12 and the coefficient for 
treatment 3 is negative but neither is significant.  Model (4) show significant effects related to 
new information, particularly negative information.  For example, the coefficient on Negative 
                                                 
12 Bids in treatment 2 less sensitively responded to additional alternatives and information provided compared to 
bids in treatment 1 and 3. Thus, we compared participants’ characteristics in treatment 2 with those in other 
treatments (Appendix 3).  According to the results, participants in treatment 2 had more female participants (about 
69%) which were different from other treatments (about 46% in treatment 1 and 40% in treatment 3). Participants in 
treatment 2 were also younger than participants in treatment 1 and 3 and they more frequently purchased ground 
beef/hamburger. 
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Information indicates a reduction of $1.12 in the bid for the irradiated burger for an individual 
who received negative information in R2, and the coefficient on Negative Positive indicates a 
reduction of $0.89 in the bid for the irradiated burger for an individual who received positive 
information in R3 having earlier received negative information in R2.  Furthermore, in both 
model (4) and (5) the estimates suggest that males bid significantly more than females for the 
irradiated burger.  In model (5) the coefficient associated with bidding in round 4 (where an 
additional substitute is made available) is negative but not statistically significant. 
Table 3-4. Panel data analysis: Random effects estimation results 
 Model (4), R1-4 Model (5), R3-4 
 Coefficient (Std. error) Coefficient (Std. error) 
Treatment 2 0.78 (0.55) 1.34 (0.68)** 
Treatment 3 -0.44 (0.54) 0.10 (0.67) 
DSub (Round 4) - -0.006 (0.005) 
Prior belief (R1 bid) - 1.39 (0.24)*** 
Positive information 0.32 (0.23) - 
Negative information -1.12 (0.22)*** - 
Negative Positive -0.89 (0.59) - 
Positive Negative 0.29 (0.55) - 
Male 1.09 (0.47)** 1.35 (0.58)** 
Age 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
Education -0.17 (0.21) -0.05 (0.25) 
Household size -0.01 (0.17) 0.09 (0.21) 
Income 0.08 (0.11) -0.11 (0.14) 
Frequency -0.0009 (0.31) 0.05 (0.38) 
Concern -0.17 (0.18) -0.42 (0.22)* 
Prior knowledge 0.20 (0.23) 0.06 (0.29) 
Constant -0.85 (1.38) -0.91 (1.67) 
No. of observations 448 224 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 Results from conditional regression and unconditional mean tests suggest that allowing 
for additional alternatives in a private value experimental auction does not seem to decrease 
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participants’ bids.  This finding appears contrary to other work on substitutes – for example, 
Cherry et al (2004) found that the presence of an outside option lowers bids.  However, as stated 
earlier, since our participants cannot choose which good they ultimately purchase our design 
does not assess the effect of substitutes, but, given the random selection of the good to be 
auctioned what we effectively assess is the effect of increased awareness of the potential 
availability of substitutes.  The finding of no significant impact is important in that it suggests 
that preferences in this experimental setting may not be as context dependent as some studies 
suggest (see Tversky and Simonson, 1993; Tufano, 2010). 
A number of studies have suggested that preferences may be constructed at the time 
decisions are made and are, therefore, context dependent (Slovic, Griffin and Tversky, 1990; 
Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1993; Bettman, Luce, and Payne, 1998; Amir and Levav, 2008). 
The idea that expressed preferences are context dependent obviously raises a concern about any 
efforts to quantify those preferences. Some previous studies have argued that familiarity of 
objects and subject experience can increase the stability of preferences, and thus lead to context-
independent preference (Hoeffler and Ariely, 1999; List, 2003; Yoon and Simonson, 2008). Our 
treatment effects in these experiments served to change a potentially important element of the 
context in which subjects submitted their bids – i.e., by changing the number of alternatives for 
which they bid and explicitly increasing awareness of potential substitutes.  But our result, i.e. 
the failure to find significant treatment effects, suggests that preferences were robust to this 
particular element of context. 
 Our results also suggest that beef consumers generally have negative preferences for the 
food safety technologies we presented - food irradiation, direct-fed microbials, and high-pressure 
processing. Participants’ negative valuations contrasted sharply with their relatively high levels 
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of stated acceptance for the same technologies.13 This conflict may be explained by the fact that 
participants were largely unfamiliar with the technologies,14 and thus, when placed in a position 
where they might potentially be required to consume an unfamiliar product opted to stick with 
the familiar “regular” burger.  
 
Objective 2a: Effect of additional alternatives on demand for new information 
 Our second objective is to investigate whether the availability of additional alternatives 
influences participant behavior in acquiring information about the irradiated product.  Our 
experiment allowed participants to bid to obtain either positive or negative information about 
food irradiation prior to bidding in R2.  Our interest is in whether the choice to bid for positive or 
negative information and the amount bid for that information is influenced by the presence of 
substitutes for the irradiated burger. 
 Table 3-5 provides descriptive statistics of the bids for positive and negative information 
across treatments.15  In all treatments a majority (63%) of those who bid for additional 
information chose to bid for positive information, and the overall average bid for positive 
information at $0.54 exceeded that for negative information at $0.46.  The treatment 1 average 
bid for positive information at $1.06 was significantly higher than the $0.22 average bid in 
treatment 2 (p = 0.005) and the $0.41 average bid in treatment 3 (p = 0.06).  However, the bids 
for negative information did not show the same pattern – there were no significant differences 
across treatments but the highest average bid of $0.58 occurred in treatment 3. 
                                                 
13 Participants’ levels of acceptance of food irradiation, DFM and HPP were 3.48, 3.93 and 3.91 respectively on a 
scale of 1= “totally unacceptable” to 5= “perfectly acceptable”. 
14 Participants’ prior knowledge about food irradiation, DFM and HPP were 1.80, 1.94 and 1.69 on a scale of 1= 
“nothing” to 5= “a great deal”. 
15 We eliminate 12 subjects who submitted either no bid or a zero bid for information since we could not distinguish 
their preferred information. 
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Table 3-5. Bids for positive or negative information about irradiation (N=100) 
  Positive information Negative information 
Treatment 1 (N=33) Choice rate 60.6% 39.4% 
 Mean 1.06 0.40 
 Median 0.38 0.20 
 St. Dev. 1.39 0.44 
Treatment 2 (N=35) Choice rate 68.6% 31.4% 
 Mean 0.22 0.39 
 Median 0.18 0.12 
 St. Dev. 0.26 0.60 
Treatment 3 (N=32) Choice rate 59.4% 40.6% 
 Mean 0.41 0.58 
 Median 0.25 0.50 
 St. Dev. 0.60 0.38 
    
 To test the effect of substitutes on choice and value of product information, we estimated 
the following Logit (model (6)) and Tobit (model (7)) models: 
𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇2 + 𝛽2𝑇3 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙1𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙2𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖            (6) 
𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇2 + 𝛽2𝑇3 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙1𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙2𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖            (7) 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖  is a discrete dependent variable representing an individuals’ choice to bid for  
positive information (𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖=1 if a subject bid for positive information and 𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖=0 if a 
person bid for negative information); 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 denotes an individual’s bid for either positive or 
negative information;  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙1𝑖  denotes control variables for socio-demographic factors 
(gender, age, education level, annual income, and household size); 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙2𝑖  denotes control 
variables for frequency of beef consumption, concern about food safety, and prior knowledge 
about food irradiation. 
 Tables 3-6 and 3-7 provide the estimation results from models (6) and (7).  The logit 
results in table 3-6 indicate that participants were more likely to bid for positive information 
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when additional alternatives were available in treatments 2 and 3 but the effect was not 
statistically significant. The estimates in table 3-7 indicate that the presence of substitutes 
significantly reduces the amount bid for positive information, but has no significant effect on the 
bids for negative information. The results suggest that participants may have a reduced incentive 
to acquire positive information about the product (i.e., the irradiated burger) if they have other 
more preferred alternatives available (bids for the other alternatives were higher than those for 
the irradiated burger).  
Table 3-6. Logit model results: Probability of choosing positive information. 
 Choice 
 Coefficient Std. Err. 
Treatment 2 0.24 0.34 
Treatment 3 0.05 0.34 
Prior belief (R1 bid) 0.23* 0.12 
Prior knowledge -0.02 0.14 
Frequency 0.15 0.20 
Male -0.27 0.29 
Age 0.01 0.01 
Education -0.04 0.14 
Household size -0.003 0.10 
Income 0.001 0.07 
Constant -0.003 0.79 
No. of observations 100 
* denotes statistical significance at 10%. 
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Table 3-7. Regression estimates: Bids for positive or negative information 
 Positive Negative 
 Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Treatment 2 -0.78 (0.24)*** 0.09 (0.17) 
Treatment 3 -0.51 (0.25)** 0.22 (0.18) 
Prior belief (R1 bid) -0.03 (0.09) -0.08 (0.05) 
Prior knowledge -0.23 (0.11)** -0.03 (0.08) 
Frequency 0.12 (0.13) -0.11 (0.13) 
Male -0.22 (0.23) 0.18 (0.14) 
Age 0.002 (0.006) -0.01 (0.005)** 
Education -0.12 (0.09) 0.12 (0.07)* 
Household size -0.16 (0.07)** -0.14 (0.06)** 
Income 0.08 (0.06) 0.06 (0.04) 
Constant 1.84 (0.58)*** 0.54 (0.43) 
No. of observations 63 37 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
   
Objective 2b: Effect of additional alternatives on the response to new information  
 Our final objective investigates whether the availability of additional alternatives 
(substitutes) for the irradiated burger influences the effect of new information on participants’ 
valuation for the product. Table 3-8 shows average bid changes for 79 participants who acquired 
new information prior to R2.  Bid changes between round 1 and 2 and between round 2 and 3 
were used to estimate effects of both positive and negative information.16 Participants more 
sensitively responded to negative information than to positive information which is consistent 
with findings from previous works (Tegene et al., 2003; Corrigan et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2011).  
                                                 
16 Some participants (3 subjects in treatment 1, 1 subject in treatment 2, and 5 subjects in treatment 3) submitted 
high over-bids (e.g. -$10, -$15, -$20) after information was provided. We treated those bids as -$3.95 since they had 
seen price for a regular beef burger as $3.95 in the questionnaire and we thought that subjects had no reason to bid 
less than -$3.95. Descriptive statistics and regression results with original data are in appendix. Results with original 
data were similar to presented results in this study. However, the standard deviation of mean bid changes from 
original data was higher than the presented results and some variables were not significant due to abnormally high 
bids. 
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Between R1 and R2 participants who acquired positive information increased their bid by $0.39 
in treatment 1, by $0.28 in treatment 2, and by $0.13 in treatment 3.  Between R2 and R3, 
participants acquiring positive information (who had earlier acquired negative information) 
increased their bid by $0.03 in treatment 1, by $0.04 in treatment 2, and by $0.15 in treatment 3.  
Pooling the effects of positive information for all 79 participants (50 acquiring positive 
information prior to R2, 29 acquiring positive information prior to R3) we observe that the mean 
change is highest in treatment 1 at $0.28 but not significantly different from the change in 
treatment 2 ($0.19, p=0.52) or that in treatment 3 ($0.14, p=0.22).  Mean bid changes caused by 
negative information also decreased with the availability of additional substitutes.  In treatment 1 
the overall average reduction in bid in response to negative information was $1.19 which was 
significantly greater (in absolute value) than the change observed in treatment 2 (-$0.24, p=0.02) 
or in treatment 3 (-$0.57, p=0.07).  
Table 3-8. Effect of information on bids across treatments 
  R1 to R2 R2 to R3 All 
  Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative 
T1 
(N=26) 
Mean* 0.39(18) -0.55(8) 0.03(8) -1.49(18) 0.28(26) -1.19(26) 
Median 0.17 -0.45 0 -0.43 0 -0.45 
St. Dev. 0.62 0.48 0.08 2.27 0.54 1.94 
T2 
(N=26) 
Mean 0.28(17) -0.31(9) 0.04(9) -0.21(17) 0.19(26) -0.24(26) 
Median 0.05 -0.10 0 -0.05 0 -0.08 
St. Dev. 0.52 0.42 0.09 0.33 0.43 0.36 
T3 
(N=27) 
Mean 0.13(15) -0.94(12) 0.15(12) -0.27(15) 0.14(27) -0.57(27) 
Median 0.15 -0.08 0 -0.22 0.10 -0.15 
St. Dev. 0.11 1.48 0.36 0.30 0.25 1.04 
* Entries represent the change in the mean bid. Numbers in parentheses are the number of observations. N=79 
participants acquired new information prior to R2.  
 
 We estimated the following model to investigate the hypothesis of a decreasing effect of 
information on bids at the individual level as more product alternatives were available: 
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𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇2 + 𝛽2𝑇3 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙1𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙2𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                              (8) 
where  𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 is the change in an individual’s bid after information is provided; 𝑇2 and 𝑇3 are 
dummies for treatments 2 and 3; 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑖 is an individual’s bid in round 1 which controls 
for individual prior perception about the product;  𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖 controls for order of providing 
information (𝐷𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖=1 if a person was provided negative information first and positive 
information later); and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙1𝑖 and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙2𝑖 contain, as earlier defined, control variables 
for demographic and other individual characteristics.    
 Table 3-9 provides estimation results for equation (8). The results indicate that allowing 
additional substitutes in treatments 2 and 3 reduces the effect of both types of product 
information. Participants less sensitively responded to product information when they had more 
alternatives for the product in the experiment.  The treatment effect is in the expected direction 
for both positive and negative information – a smaller increase for positive information and a 
smaller decrease (positive coefficient) in the case of negative information – but significant only 
in the case of negative information.  We combined data from the effects of both positive and 
negative information and included a dummy for positive information effect (i.e. DPos=1 if a bid 
change is caused by positive information) and its interactions with the two treatments (i.e. 
DPos*T2 and DPos*T3).  Results from the pooled model results also showed that participants 
significantly decrease their bid changes caused by information when additional alternatives are 
available in the experiment. This result has important implications for experimental auction 
applications since many previous valuation studies focusing on the effect of product information 
do not allow multiple substitutes and this environment might cause an overstatement of the 
information effect. 
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Table 3-9. Impact of allowing substitutes on the effect of information 
 Positive Negative Pooling 
Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Treatment 2 -0.06 (0.12) 0.96 (0.35)*** 0.97 (0.26)*** 
Treatment 3 -0.05 (0.12) 0.57 (0.34)* 0.65 (0.26)** 
Prior belief -0.06 (0.04) -0.31 (0.11)*** -0.19 (0.06)*** 
Prior knowledge -0.07 (0.06) 0.02 (0.16) -0.02 (0.09) 
Frequency -0.06 (0.07) -0.18 (0.19) -0.12 (0.11) 
Concern -0.03 (0.04) -0.07 (0.11) -0.05 (0.06) 
Negpos -0.16 (0.11) -0.30 (0.30) -0.23 (0.17) 
Gender 0.002 (0.11) 0.63 (0.30)** 0.32 (0.16)* 
Age 0.005 (0.003) 0.002 (0.01) 0.003 (0.005) 
Education -0.01 (0.04) 0.18 (0.12) 0.08 (0.07) 
Household size -0.04 (0.04) 0.14 (0.11) 0.05 (0.06) 
Income 0.01 (0.03) -0.14 (0.07)* -0.06 (0.04) 
Constant 0.52 (0.30)* -1.48 (0.85)* -1.22 (0.48)** 
DPos - - 1.48 (0.25)*** 
DPos*T2 - - -1.04 (0.36)*** 
DPos*T3 - - -0.77 (0.36)** 
No. of Obs. 79 79 158 
 *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 3.4. Conclusions 
 Experimental auctions frequently use a controlled small scale environment in an attempt 
to predict how consumers might behave in the real world market.  It is important therefore that 
the experimental market environment reflects, to the greatest extent possible, the relevant 
characteristics of that wider market.  According to previous findings, allowing substitutes can 
impact the values elicited in experimental markets and thus the inclusion of substitutes is one of 
the ways in which experimental auction markets can be made more realistic. 
 In this study we designed an experimental to examine the effects of the availability of 
additional alternatives on participants’ values for a private good. Our design does not permit the 
additional alternatives to serve as substitutes in the true economic sense because our participants 
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do not have the ability to choose which of the alternative products to purchase – that selection 
was made via a random draw.  Thus, while our treatments alter the context in which bidding 
takes place, and enhance participants’ awareness of the potential availability of substitutes in the 
wider market, any impacts due to treatments are, at most, a lower bound estimate of the impact 
of substitutes.   
 Our results indicate that allowing additional alternatives in a private value auction did not 
significantly affect valuation for primary product of interest – the exchange of a regular burger 
for an irradiated burger.  Differences in bidding across treatments were not sufficiently large to 
reject the hypothesis of bid equality.  Economic theory and prior studies suggest that the 
presence of substitutes will result in lower bids for the product of interest.  Our results suggest 
that our subjects did not consider the additional alternatives as substitutes – which, given the 
experimental design in which the product they would obtain was determined via a random draw, 
they were not.  The fact that altering the context of bidding by introducing additional alternatives 
(which are not substitutes) did not produce a significant change in bidding behavior is itself 
important – as it suggests that bidding behavior in the 4th price auction is robust to such changes 
in context.  If this result holds with replication and larger samples, it suggests that experimental 
practitioners need not be concerned about whether their designs value individual goods or 
multiple related goods – the elicited values ought not to be affected.   
 Our results did however indicate that the presence of additional alternatives tended to 
reduce both the value and effect of additional product information.  In the wider market, the 
availability of additional substitutes reduces demand for a product and may in turn reduce 
demand for additional information about that product and also mitigate the impact of that 
information once acquired.  Our results appear to reflect those effects – suggesting that, in regard 
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to their behavior in acquiring and using information, subjects treated the additional alternatives 
as if they were in fact substitutes.  Beyond merely attributing the difference to context, it may be 
that simply informing participants about the potential availability of substitutes has a similar 
effect to making substitutes available.  The finding is important because it reminds 
experimentalists examining information effects that their results may very much depend on 
context.  Identifying information effect has become quite routine in experimental valuation 
studies for new products or product attributes. Studies examining information effects without the 
context of substitutes may well be overestimating both the interest in acquiring information and 
the impact of that information on product valuation.     
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Appendix 1. Description of food irradiation, DFM, and HPP provided prior to bidding 
Food Irradiation 
Food is irradiated in special processing facilities where it is exposed to an electron beam or X-
rays generated using electricity, or to gamma rays emitted by cobalt-60. Food irradiation 
controls spoilage and eliminates harmful foodborne bacteria. The result is similar to 
pasteurization. The fundamental difference between food irradiation and pasteurization is the 
source of the energy used to destroy the bacteria. While conventional pasteurization uses heat, 
irradiation uses energy from ionizing radiation. 
Direct-Fed Microbials (Probiotics) 
The terms direct-fed microbial and probiotic are used interchangeably. They are animal feed 
additives that contain microbial species that are considered to be non-pathogenic normal flora. 
A probiotic is defined as “a live microbial feed supplement which beneficially affects the host 
by improving its intestinal microbial balance” Direct-fed microbials or probiotics can 
potentially improve resistance to disease, reduce shedding of pathogens, increase intestinal 
immunity, reduce disease symptoms, and improve animal health. 
High Pressure Processing (HPP) 
High Pressure Processing (HPP) is an antimicrobial treatment for meat and poultry products.  
HPP subjects food to elevated pressures, with or without the addition of heat, to inactivate 
microorganisms and extend microbiological shelf life. Product processed with HPP is placed 
in a sealed flexible container. The flexible container is placed in a basket or barrel and moved 
to a high-pressure chamber filled with a pressure-transmitting fluid (usually water) that does 
not come in contact with the food product. The high pressure kills or damages harmful 
foodborne bacteria. 
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Appendix 2. Positive and Negative Descriptions of Food Irradiation 
Pro-Food irradiation perspective 
Food irradiation is a process that destroys harmful bacteria and pathogens by treating foods 
with ionizing radiation. Food irradiation has been shown to be highly effective in destroying 
bacteria and parasites responsible for food poisoning. Extensive research has proven that 
irradiation is a safe and reliable process, and it has been approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration, the American Medical Association, and the World Health Organization. 
Each year as many as 9,000 people die in the U.S. from food-borne illness. Millions more 
suffer short term illness due to pathogens such as Salmonella, Listeria and E.coli. By 
eliminating these pathogens from food, irradiation can help to greatly reduce the number of 
food borne illnesses.  
 
Anti-Food irradiation perspective 
Food irradiation is a process whereby food is exposed to radioactive materials, and receives as 
much as 300,000 rads of radiation - the equivalent of 30 million chest x-rays- in order to 
extend the shelf life of the food and kill insects and bacteria. While it is unlikely that food 
products themselves will become radioactive, irradiation results in the creation of chemicals 
called radiolytic products, some of which are known carcinogens. Studies have also suggested 
that irradiation may be linked to cancer and birth defects. Food irradiation can kill most of the 
pathogenic bacteria present in food, but so can proper cooking. Food irradiation was 
developed in the 1950’s by the Atomic Energy Commission. The objective was to seek 
potential uses for the byproducts of nuclear weapons production. Today’s food irradiation 
industry is a private, for-profit business enterprise with ties to the U.S. nuclear weapons and 
nuclear power industries. 
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Appendix 3. Sample Characteristics across treatments 
Variable Categories 
T1 (N=35) T2 (N=39) T3 (N=38) 
Mean 
(Std.Dev.) 
Mean 
(Std.Dev.) 
Mean 
(Std.Dev.) 
Age Years 42.9 (17.1) 35.9 (17.7) 38.3 (16.5) 
Household size Persons 2.9 (1.4) 3.1 (1.4) 3.3 (1.6) 
Gender Male 54.3% 30.8% 60.5% 
Female 45.7% 69.2% 39.5% 
Family income Less than $40,000 8.6% 20.5% 23.7% 
$40,001 - $100,000 37.1% 53.8% 39.5% 
More than $100,001 54.3% 25.6% 36.8% 
Education level High school graduate 2.9% 0% 0% 
College graduate 48.6% 66.7% 68.4% 
Graduate degree 48.6% 33.3% 31.6% 
Frequency1 At least once a week 80.0% 87.2% 65.8% 
2-3 times a month 14.3% 5.1% 18.4% 
About once a month 2.9% 5.1% 15.8% 
Less than once a month 2.9% 2.6% 0% 
Concern2 1: Not at all concerned - 
5: Very concerned 
3.4 (1.3) 3.1 (1.3) 3.3 (1.1) 
Prior knowledge3 1: Nothing -  
5: A great deal 
1.9 (0.9) 1.7 (0.9) 1.8 (1.1) 
Acceptance4 1: Totally unacceptable -
5: Perfectly acceptable 
3.4 (1.2) 3.3 (1.1) 3.7 (1.2) 
1 Frequency of buying Ground beef/Hamburger 
2 Safety concern about Ground beef/Hamburger 
3 Prior knowledge about Food Irradiation 
4 Level of acceptance of using Food Irradiation in meat processing 
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Appendix 4. Effects of information across treatments from original data 
  A1 to A2 A2 to A3 All 
  Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative 
T1 
(N=26) 
Mean 0.45 -0.55 0.03 -2.27 0.32 -1.74 
Median 0.17 -0.45 0 -0.43 0 -0.45 
St. Dev. 0.71 0.48 0.08 5.22 0.62 4.38 
T2 
(N=26) 
Mean 0.28 -0.31 0.04 -0.21 0.19 -0.24 
Median 0.05 -0.10 0 -0.05 0 -0.08 
St. Dev. 0.52 0.42 0.09 0.33 0.43 0.36 
T3 
(N=27) 
Mean 0.13 -3.70 0.24 -0.27 0.18 -1.80 
Median 0.15 -0.88 0 -0.22 0.10 -0.25 
St. Dev. 0.11 5.21 0.43 0.30 0.29 3.81 
 
Appendix 5. Impact of allowing substitutes on information effect from original data 
 Positive Negative Pooling 
Coefficient (Std.Err.) Coefficient (Std.Err.) Coefficient (Std.Err.) 
Treatment 2 -0.11 (0.14) 1.82 (0.98)* 1.67 (0.69)** 
Treatment 3 -0.10 (0.13) -0.09 (0.96) -0.05 (0.67) 
Prior belief -0.11 (0.04)** 0.66 (0.31)** 0.28 (0.16)* 
Prior knowledge -0.03 (0.06) 0.06 (0.44) 0.02 (0.22) 
Frequency 0.04 (0.07) 0.01 (0.55) 0.03 (0.28) 
Concern -0.04 (0.04) -0.32 (0.32) -0.18 (0.16) 
Negpos -0.17 (0.11) -0.47 (0.84) -0.32 (0.43) 
Gender -0.006 (0.12) 1.77 (0.84)** 0.88 (0.43)** 
Age 0.004 (0.003) 0.01 (0.03) 0.007 (0.01) 
Education -0.03 (0.05) -0.06 (0.34) -0.05 (0.18) 
Household size -0.06 (0.04) 0.13 (0.29) 0.03 (0.15) 
Income 0.004 (0.03) -0.08 (0.20) -0.04 (0.11) 
Constant 0.60 (0.33)* -1.33 (2.36) -1.39 (1.25) 
DPos - - 2.06 (0.66)*** 
DPos*T2 - - -1.63 (0.94)* 
DPos*T3 - - -0.09 (0.93) 
No. of obs. 79 79 158 
 *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Chapter 4 - The Effect of Acquired or Provided Information on 
Consumer Valuation in a Private Value Experimental Auction  
 
 4.1. Introduction 
 Markets for some food attributes or processes such as genetic modification (GM), food 
irradiation, etc. can be characterized as having disparate information. Thus, opponents of GM 
cite its potential risks to human health and the environment while proponents may tout its record 
of safety and its role in enhancing food security. For consumers, information has value since it 
can help them make better market choices (Rousu and Lusk, 2009). Acquiring information is not 
costless however, and the cost of acquiring and verifying information will differ across 
individuals and among products and product attributes. Consumers seek out the information that 
is of most value to them and make purchase decisions based on that information. Thus, in market 
settings the types and amounts of information that is obtained is endogenously decided by 
consumers, and depends on each consumer’s valuation of information.  
 Previous studies have investigated the effects of information in experimental auction 
markets (Fox et al., 2002; Tegene et al., 2003; Lusk et al., 2004; Rousu et al., 2004; Corrigan et 
al., 2009; Lee et al., 2011;  Schmit et al., 2013). Without exception, however, those studies 
provide information to participants at no restriction and then generally proceed to measure the 
effect of that information on consumers’ choices. The results of those studies might differ from 
the reality of the world since they do not account for the way that information is actually 
acquired by consumers.  
 To our knowledge, no study has explicitly considered consumer behavior in acquiring 
information in an experimental auction. We therefore design an experiment to examine the effect 
of acquired information on auction participants’ purchasing behaviors in a private value 
53 
experimental auction. We focus on three questions: i) how subjects choose/value different types 
of information, ii) whether the value of acquired information about a product influences the 
subsequent valuation of the product itself, and iii) whether the effects of acquired information 
differ from those of exogenously provided information.  
 Answering these questions will be important to recognize in experimental auction 
applications. Consumers make decisions under imperfect information in real world markets. 
Under imperfection of information, consumers’ decision making relies on their current 
information and acquired new information (Simonson et al., 1988). Thus, acquiring new 
information is critical in the decision-making process. The main objective of applying 
experimental auctions in consumer economy is to predict decision makers’ behaviors outside of 
the laboratory.  To the extent that the laboratory environment can better replicate aspects of real 
world markets it should produce better predictions of consumer behavior in those real world 
markets.  Thus, a laboratory environment that better replicates the way information is acquired in 
the real world may better predict consumer behavior in the market. 
 
 4.2. Information Acquisition 
 Acquiring information is an important market activity since decision makers formulate 
knowledge about products or product attributes based on acquired information. According to 
Stigler (1961) and Nelson (1970), the most obvious way of obtaining information is search and 
this activity is costly. Knowledge formation based on information is also heterogeneous across 
people since each person has different prior knowledge, experiences and beliefs about the 
product so their strategies of acquiring information will be different (Bucklin, 1966; Green et al., 
1967; Dickson, 1981; Moore and Lehmann, 1980). 
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 Several previous studies have examined consumer information acquisition. The 
fundamental studies are those of Stigler (1961) and Nelson (1970). Stigler (1961) examined 
consumer behavior in purchasing homogenous goods under imperfect information. In his model, 
only price varies across firms and all product information is reflected by price offered by firms. 
Because of costly search activity which is not equal for each consumer, a consumer makes a 
strategy for acquiring information. They fix the number of searches (i.e. stores) prior to 
searching and choose the best alternative (i.e. the store offering the lowest price). Nelson (1970) 
extended Stigler’s search theory by considering both the quality and price variation of products. 
He argued that information about quality is more expensive to buy than information about price, 
which can cause different consumer behaviors. Consumers also use ‘experience’ as an alternative 
to ‘search’ in order to obtain information about the quality of goods. Both studies assumed that 
search for information continued only if the expected utility benefit from the additional 
information is greater than the expected search cost. 
 Search theory predicts that in markets with imperfect information consumers will first 
acquire the most valued information, followed by less valued information. Given this premise, 
some previous studies have investigated the sequence of information acquisition (Hagerty and 
Aaker, 1984; Meyer, 1982). Meyer (1982) presented a model for information search that focuses 
on the choice between alternatives given the assumption that consumers cognitively formulate 
subjective values for the attributes of alternatives and follow a recursive process of information 
search. In that model, subjective utility values are first assigned to product brands using available 
information about products’ attributes, and then a selected brand among alternatives is evaluated. 
Subjective values can be updated using acquired new information about product attributes. 
Hagerty and Aaker (1984) developed a normative model predicting consumer behaviors of 
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searching for information and then compared these predictions with actual information search 
patterns. According to their framework, information search reduces the uncertainty in evaluation 
of alternatives and improves the consumer decision process. The results also showed that a 
greater utility differences between alternatives results in a smaller value for additional 
information. 
 Knowledgeable consumers can facilitate more efficient information processing since they 
can focus only on relevant information which is related to decision making (Johnson and Russo, 
1984). Based on this expectation, some previous studies have examined the relationship between 
prior knowledge about product/product attributes and information acquisition (Bettman and Park, 
1980; Simonson et al., 1988; Rao and Sieben, 1992). Bettman and Park (1980) analyzed effects 
of prior knowledge and experience on choice processes in terms of both the types of information 
used and the kinds of processing used. According to their results, moderate-knowledge subjects 
have enough ability and motivation to process the new information presented to them and to 
devote substantial processing effort to the product choice task. However, low-knowledge 
subjects do not have enough ability and motivation to process the information. High-knowledge 
subjects also have enough ability to process information but less motivation to do so since they 
do not need additional information in the decision process. Instead, they rely on their prior 
knowledge and experience. Simonson et al (1988) examined the effects of prior brand knowledge 
and information certainty on the acquisition order of additional information. Both prior beliefs 
and the degree of certainty of those beliefs have impacts on the acquisition order of new 
information. In particular, lower certainty of prior knowledge and less favorable prior beliefs 
lead to earlier acquisition of information. Rao and Sieben (1992) identified how prior knowledge 
affects the acceptable price range of products and the examination of different types of 
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information used in value judgements. The results showed that low-knowledge subjects have the 
lowest price range limits and that the price range limits increase with higher prior knowledge. 
Moreover, knowledgeable subjects tended to more rely on extrinsic information such as price 
which is perceived as product quality and moderately knowledgeable subjects used intrinsic 
information such as physical attributes of the product. Low knowledgeable subjects could not 
interpret intrinsic information and thus relied more on interpretable information such as physical 
attributes of the product. 
 Perceived risk can be positively related to information acquisition since people try to 
reduce risk by seeking more information (Cox, 1967). One strand of research confirmed a 
positive relationship between risk and information acquisition (Capon and Burke, 1980; 
Locander and Hermann, 1979), while another found contradictory evidence (Ring et al., 1980; 
Jacoby et al., 1978). Several researchers have also argued that search cost which can affect 
information acquisition is reflected in an individual’s income since higher income potentially has 
a higher opportunity cost of time (Farley, 1964; Ratchford, 1982; Punj and Staelin, 1983). 
However, Goldman and Johansson (1978) showed no significant relationship between income 
and information search. Intelligence is also closely related to capacity for processing and storing 
information (Bachelder and Denny, 1977). Given this premise, Loudon and Della Bitta (1979) 
concluded that highly-educated consumers (i.e. more intelligent individuals) are more interested 
in seeking information about the product than less intelligent consumers. 
 Information acquisition is an important process in decision making under imperfect 
information. The way people acquire and process information influences their choice processes. 
According to previous studies, individual behavior in seeking information will differ because 
search cost and motivations for obtaining information vary across individuals. Moreover, prior 
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knowledge (i.e. information held in an individual’s memory), experience (i.e. purchasing 
experience), and individual characteristics (i.e. risk attitude, income, education) have important 
roles in information acquisition. In this study, we consider factors affecting information 
acquisition by allowing subjects to directly value and obtain information in an experimental 
auction market and investigate the effect of acquired information on consumers’ choice 
behaviors.  
 
 4.3. Experimental Design 
 A total of 112 consumers participated in experimental auctions in which the object of 
valuation was reduced food safety risk. Subjects were endowed with a “regular” beef burger and 
could bid to upgrade to an “irradiated” beef burger described as having lower risk of bacterial 
contamination. The design included three treatments that differed in the availability of 
alternatives for the irradiated burger. Only the irradiated beef burger was available in the first 
treatment. The second treatment added a burger from cattle treated with direct-fed microbials 
(DFM burger), and the third added both the DFM burger and a burger treated with high pressure 
processing (HPP burger). 
 On arrival, participants signed a consent form, were provided an ID number, and were 
paid their participation fee. Next they completed a questionnaire and were then surveyed about 
their risk preferences. To elicit an individual risk preference, we used the multiple price list 
(MPL) devised by Holt and Laury (2002).  Using the same design as Lusk and Coble (2005) 
(table 4-1) each participant was asked to make 11 decisions between lottery A and lottery B. 
With each successive row, the expected value of lottery B increases relative to lottery A. A 
highly risk-loving individual would choose lottery B in the second decision row and a very risk-
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averse individual would choose lottery A in the tenth decision row. A risk neutral individual 
would choose lottery A in the first five rows and switch to lottery B in the sixth. To help 
participants better understand the process, we made the first and last decisions for them.  
Table 4-1. Lottery selection 
Decision Row Lottery A Lottery B Your preference 
1 
0% chance of $10.00, 
100% chance of $8.00 
0% chance of $19.00, 
100% chance of $1.00 
A 
2 
10% chance of $10.00, 
90% chance of $8.00 
10% chance of $19.00, 
90% chance of $1.00 
 
3 
20% chance of $10.00, 
80% chance of $8.00 
20% chance of $19.00, 
80% chance of $1.00 
 
4 
30% chance of $10.00, 
70% chance of $8.00 
30% chance of $19.00, 
70% chance of $1.00 
 
5 
40% chance of $10.00, 
60% chance of $8.00 
40% chance of $19.00, 
60% chance of $1.00 
 
6 
50% chance of $10.00, 
50% chance of $8.00 
50% chance of $19.00, 
50% chance of $1.00 
 
7 
60% chance of $10.00, 
40% chance of $8.00 
60% chance of $19.00, 
40% chance of $1.00 
 
8 
70% chance of $10.00, 
30% chance of $8.00 
70% chance of $19.00, 
30% chance of $1.00 
 
9 
80% chance of $10.00, 
20% chance of $8.00 
80% chance of $19.00, 
20% chance of $1.00 
 
10 
90% chance of $10.00, 
10% chance of $8.00 
90% chance of $19.00, 
10% chance of $1.00 
 
11 
100% chance of $10.00, 
0% chance of $8.00 
100% chance of $19.00, 
0% chance of $1.00 
B 
 
 Participants were told that the winner would be determined at the end of the experiment.  
To select the winner, we would randomly select one participant’s ID number from an envelope. 
That individual would then select from another envelope a number corresponding to a row from 
table 1 and would then play the lottery they had selected on that row to determine their winnings.  
 Following the risk preference elicitation, subject were informed they would participate in 
a number of non-hypothetical 4th price endowment auctions in which they could bid to exchange 
one good for another. A practice auction was conducted using candy bars, and subjects were told 
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that their best strategy in the auction was to bid an amount equal to the true value they placed on 
exchanging one good for the other.17  Following Lee and Fox (2015) the auction permitted 
negative bids.  We allow negative bids because the auctioned products be perceived as either 
superior or inferior to the endowed product. At the end of the candy bar auction the top three 
bidders exchanged their endowed candy bar for the auctioned candy bar and paid (or received) 
an amount equal to the 4th highest bid.   
 Next, participants were shown a burger and informed that they owned (and would be 
required to consume) a similar burger but would have an opportunity to exchange it for an 
alternative burger in a series of auctions (henceforth referred to as rounds), one of which – 
determined via a random draw - would be binding.  Descriptions of the endowed “regular” 
burger and the alternative (irradiated, DFM, or HPP) burgers were provided.  If the binding 
auction round featured more than one alternative burger, the burger to be sold would also be 
determined via a random draw.   
 Following the first of four bidding rounds we conducted an auction for additional 
information about food irradiation. Two types of information were available - a pro-food 
irradiation perspective focusing on the safety and benefits of the process, and an anti-food 
irradiation perspective focusing on potential risks. Subjects were allowed to bid for only one type 
of information, not for both. For the information auction we used a BDM mechanism with a low 
price distribution (max price 12c) selected to maximize the probability of participants’ actually 
purchasing one type of information.  Winning bidders read the information they acquired before 
bidding in round 2. Subsequently, prior to product bidding in round 3, all participants were 
provided, free of charge, the information they had not already acquired in information auction. 
                                                 
17 A copy of the instructions used in the experiment is available from the authors. 
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Thus, if they had already obtained the positive information via the information auction they were 
given the negative information and vice-versa. If they had not acquired either type of information 
they were provided both types of information about food irradiation. 
 
 4.4. Experimental Results 
 Table 4-2 provides summary statistics of participants’ demographic variables. 
Participants frequently buy ground beef and hamburger and they are moderately concerned about 
the safety of consuming those products. Participants also indicate moderately high safety ratings 
for meat treated with irradiation and moderately high levels of acceptance of using food 
irradiation in meat processing.  
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Table 4-2. Summary statistics of demographic variables (N=112) 
Variable Categories Mean Std. Dev. 
Age Years  38.9 4.27 
Household size Persons  3.14 1.51 
Gender Male =1, Female = 0 0.48 0.50 
Prior knowledge1 1: Nothing – 5: A great deal 1.8 0.96 
Concern2 1: Not at all concerned - 5: Very concerned 3.27 1.25 
Acceptance3 1: Totally unacceptable – 5: Perfectly acceptable 3.48 1.18 
Rate of safety4 1: Very unsafe – 5: Very safe 3.60 1.11 
Family income Less than $20,000 7.14% 
$20,001 – 30,000 5.36% 
$30,001 – 40,000 5.36% 
$40,001 – 50,000 8.04% 
$50,001 – 75,000 14.3% 
$75,001 – 100,000 21.4% 
$100,001 – 125,000 16.1% 
$125,001 – 150,000 12.5% 
More than $150,000 9.8% 
Education level High school graduate 0.9% 
College graduate 61.6% 
Graduate degree 37.5% 
Frequency5 At least once a week 77.6% 
2-3 times a month 12.5% 
About once a month 8% 
Less than once a month 1.8% 
1 Prior knowledge about food irradiation 
2 Safety concern about ground beef/hamburger 
3 Level of acceptance of using irradiation in meat processing 
4 Rate of the safety of meat treated with irradiation 
5 Frequency of buying Ground beef/Hamburger 
 
 As mentioned earlier, we measured individuals’ risk preference using a multiple price list 
(MPL) since individual risk attitudes can influence information acquisition (Capon and Burke, 
1980; Locander and Hermann, 1979). Table 3 shows the frequency of participants’ lottery 
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choices.18 We eliminated 8 subjects from the sample since they changed their decisions more 
than two times during the lottery experiment. We assumed that participants have a constant 
relative risk aversion utility function, 𝑈(𝑥) = 𝑥(1−𝑟𝑟)/(1 − 𝑟𝑟), to determine the range of the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion (rr) and assumed that participants have a constant absolute 
risk aversion utility function, 𝑈(𝑥) = −exp (−𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑥), to determine the range of the coefficient 
of absolute risk aversion (ar).  
Table 4-3. Risk Aversion Coefficients based on Lottery Choices 
Decision 
Row 
Range of 
Relative Risk 
(rr) Aversion 
Range of 
Absolute Risk 
(ar) Aversion 
Percentage of Choices 
T1* T2 T3 All 
~ 2 <-0.968 <-0.112 3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 
3 -0.968<rr<-0.488 -0.112<ar<-0.059 3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 
4 -0.488<rr<-0.122 -0.059<ar<-0.015 9.1% 19.4% 17.1% 15.4% 
5 -0.122<rr<0.192 -0.015<ar<0.025 21.2% 16.7% 31.4% 23.1% 
6 0.192<rr<0.487 0.025<ar<0.066 21.2% 11.1% 11.4% 14.4% 
7 0.487<rr<0.788 0.066<ar<0.111 24.2% 36.1% 22.9% 27.9% 
8 0.788<rr<1.131 0.111<ar<0.167 15.2% 11.1% 11.4% 12.5% 
9 1.131<rr<1.608 0.167<ar<0.253 0.0% 5.6% 2.9% 2.9% 
10 ~ 1.608< 0.253< 3.0% 0.0% 2.9% 1.9% 
Number of Observations 33 36 35 104 
*T1, T2, and T3 denoted experimental treatments.  
 
 According to the results, about 17% of participants showed risk-loving behavior while 
the majority exhibited risk-averse behavior. In the following analysis we use individuals’ relative 
risk aversion coefficient since the utility function we assumed to estimate this coefficient has 
been used by previous studies (e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002; Andersen et al., 2008) and this 
function allows decreasing absolute risk aversion which is mostly consistent with experimental 
                                                 
18 We estimated both relative and absolute risk aversion by creating indifference of the expected utility between 
lottery A and lottery B with different assumption of utility function.  
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evidence (Friden and Blume, 1975). As a measure of individual risk preference, we use the 
median value of the minimum and maximum of each range (Lusk and Coble, 2005). 
 Table 4-4 summarizes the data from both the product and information auctions. As 
reflected by the negative average bids participants have lower valuations for the alternative beef 
burgers (irradiated, direct-fed microbials, and high pressure processed) compared to the regular 
beef burger.  The overall valuations for positive and negative information are 0.47 and 0.36 
respectively with higher average valuation for negative information in treatments 2 and 3.19 
Within each treatment the difference in mean value between positive and negative information is 
not statistically significant (p = 0.11, p = 0.39, and p = 0.58 for each treatment) and similarly the 
value difference in also not significant for the full sample (p = 0.44). 
Table 4-4. Bids for alternative burgers and for positive/negative information about 
irradiation. 
 Treatment 1 (N=35) Treatment 2 (N=39) Treatment 3 (N=38) 
Mean Median St. 
Dev. 
Mean Median St. 
Dev. 
Mean Median St. 
Dev. 
Round 1 Irradiation -0.152 0 1.384 -0.274 -0.02 0.631 -0.471 0 1.351 
DFM    -0.021 0 0.674 -0.075 0 1.071 
HPP       0.001 0 0.719 
Information Positive 1.063 0.375 1.386 0.189 0.100 0.251 0.310 0.100 0.552 
Negative 0.402 0.200 0.435 0.291 0.100 0.541 0.394 0.250 0.412 
Round 2 Irradiation -0.026 0 1.336 -0.208 0 0.543 -1.561 0 4.362 
DFM    -0.075 0 0.635 -0.147 0 1.797 
HPP       -0.127 0 1.724 
Round 3 Irradiation -1.435 -0.25 3.544 -0.480 -0.15 0.953 -1.646 0 4.325 
DFM    -0.099 0 0.663 -0.226 0 1.754 
HPP       -0.169 0 1.719 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Four participants submitted unusually high bids for positive information in treatment 1 (e.g. one subject bid $5 
and three subjects bid $3). If we eliminate those bids, the average bid for positive information becomes 0.403 which 
is quite similar to the average bid for negative information in treatment 1. The overall bid for positive information 
without those four high bids becomes 0.29 which is smaller than overall bid for negative information. 
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Choice and value of information. 
 Our first objective was to identify factors affecting individuals’ choice and value of 
different types of information about food irradiation. We use the following Probit and Tobit 
specifications to examine the question: 
𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑖𝑑1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖
+ 𝛽8𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡2 + 𝛽12𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡3 + 𝜖𝑖                      (1) 
𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑖𝑑1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖
+ 𝛽8𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡2 + 𝛽12𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡3 + 𝜀𝑖                      (2) 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 is an individuals’ choice of positive information (𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖=1 if a person chose 
positive information, 𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖=0 if a person chose negative information); 𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 is the 
individual’s bid for either positive or negative information; 𝐵𝑖𝑑1𝑖 denotes an individual’s bids to 
exchange the regular beef burger for an irradiated beef burger in round 1; 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐾𝑖 is prior 
knowledge about food irradiation; 𝑅𝑃𝑖 is individual risk perception about food safety; 𝑅𝑅𝑖 is an 
individuals’ relative risk aversion coefficient; 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖 denotes frequency of consuming ground 
beef/hamburger; 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖 is individual household income; 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖, 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖, 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖, and 𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 
represent gender (male = 1, female =0), age, education level, and household size respectively; 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡2 and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡3 denote dummies for treatments 2 and 3; 𝜖𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖 are distributed by the normal 
distribution. 
 Consumers’ choice of information can depend on their prior belief and prior knowledge 
about the product (Bettman and Park, 1980; Simonson et al., 1988; Rao and Sieben, 1992; Rabin 
and Schrag, 1999; Jones and Sugden, 2001). To represent prior belief about the product (i.e., 
about the irradiated beef burger), we include the participants’ first round bids since they directly 
reflect perception about the product before having any additional information. We elicited 
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participants knowledge about food irradiation with the question “How much do you know about 
food irradiation?” with responses on a 5 point Likert scale from 1 (Nothing) to 5 (A great deal). 
 Perceived risk and risk preference are also considered as important factors affecting 
information acquisition (Cox, 1967; Locander and Hermann, 1979; Capon and Burke, 1980) and 
both factors have been considered in consumer demand for controversial food products such as 
genetically modified and irradiated food (Lusk and Coble, 2005).  As earlier described, 
individual risk attitudes were elicited using preferences over lotteries. To quantify individuals’ 
perceived risk in consuming meat products, participants were asked whether they agreed or 
disagreed with four statements. Responses to each question were on a 10 point Likert scale from 
1 (Strongly disagree) to 10 (Strongly agree). Table 4-5 provides summary statistics for the risk 
perception questions. In order to use these questions as a measure of risk perception, we summed 
the responses from each question and standardized it to have zero mean and unit standard 
deviation (Lusk and Coble, 2005). Pennings and Wansink (2004) used the interaction effect 
between risk preference and risk perception instead of separate effects since perceived risk 
would depend on risk preference and using an interaction term was consistent with the work of 
Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971). Our risk preference and perception measures showed low 
correlation (𝜌 = −0.14) and was not statistically significant (p = 0.15). Thus, we included them 
in the model as linear effects instead of using an interaction term. 
 Participants’ socio-demographic factors (i.e. income, gender, age, education level, 
household size) are also included in the model since these variables may affect acquisition of 
different type of information based on results from previous studies. Frequency of consuming 
beef products is also included because people who buy more beef products may have a greater 
66 
interest in obtaining additional information. To control for treatment effects, we include a 
dummy for each treatment. 
Table 4-5. Risk perception in consuming meat products 
Statement Mean St. Dev. 
Consuming meat products always involves some level of risk from 
harmful bacteria 
6.09 2.34 
Bacteria such as E. coli pose a great risks of illness to my family and me 4.54 2.53 
Meat processors need to implement additional safeguards to reduce the 
risk of foodborne disease to consumers 
6.45 2.49 
My family and I need to be careful when preparing meat products at 
home in order to reduce the risk of foodborne disease 
8.45 1.84 
Number of observations* 111 
* One participant did not finish questions so summary statistics were based on 111 subjects. 
  
 Consumers’ valuation for a specific product can be affected by individual characteristics. 
Thus, we initially thought that the model may have an endogeneity problem since the first round 
bid could be correlated with other regressors. However, the preliminary data analysis showed 
relatively low correlations ranging from 0.02 to 0.19 between the first bid and other explanatory 
variables. We also conducted the exogeneity test of the first bid in both models. According to 
Wald tests, we failed to reject the hypothesis of exogeneity (positive information: p = 0.59 in 
model (1) and p = 0.63 in model (2); negative information: p = 0.53 in model (1) and p = 0.99 in 
model (2)).  
 Table 4-6 provides regression results from equation (1) and (2). The choice of which type 
of information about food irradiation to bid relied only on prior belief about the product. 
Participants were more likely to bid for positive information and less likely to bid for negative 
information when they had positive prior belief about the product. People have a tendency to 
confirm their prior belief by searching for new information which agrees with the prior belief. 
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We call this human behavior “Positive confirmation bias”. Many psychologists have proposed 
that this positive confirmation is a part of natural human reasoning which can affect the decision 
process (Jones and Sugden, 2001). Our experimental data showed that about 68 percent of 
participants who bid a positive value for the exchange for the irradiated burger bid for positive 
information about food irradiation. However, only 43 percent of participants who placed a 
negative value on the exchange for the irradiated burger chose to bid for negative information. 
This may imply that participants who have positive prior belief tend to confirm their prior belief 
by acquiring new information which agrees with their beliefs while participants who have 
negative prior belief tended to disconfirm their belief by acquiring information which disagree 
with their belief.  
Table 4-6. Factors affecting choice and value of information 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Positive information=1 
Negative information=0 
Positive 
information 
Negative 
information 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Prior belief 0.26 (0.12)** 0.02 (0.09) -0.05 (0.04) 
Prior Knowledge -0.02 (0.15) -0.27 (0.11)** -0.05 (0.07) 
Risk perception -0.14 (0.14) -0.20 (0.10)* 0.07 (0.06) 
Risk preference 0.27 (0.29) 0.27 (0.21) -0.31 (0.10)*** 
Frequency 0.16 (0.20) 0.13 (0.13) -0.12 (0.11) 
Income 0.008 (0.07) 0.07 (0.06) 0.04 (0.03) 
Gender -0.32 (0.29) -0.29 (0.22) 0.14 (0.12) 
Age 0.02 (0.01) 0.008 (0.006) -0.02 (0.005)*** 
Education -0.07 (0.14) -0.16 (0.09)* 0.13 (0.06)** 
HHsize -0.001 (0.10) -0.15 (0.07)** -0.14 (0.05)** 
Tret2 0.21 (0.34) -0.81 (0.23)*** 0.15 (0.15) 
Tret3 0.10 (0.34) -0.42 (0.24)* 0.25 (0.16) 
Constant -0.15 (0.81) 1.78 (0.55)*** 0.81 (0.38)** 
Number of Obs. 100 63 37 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
(  ) represents standard error. 
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 The results did not indicate any relationship between prior knowledge and information 
choice. Similarly, there was no impact associated with individuals’ risk characteristics which is 
consistent with previous studies (Jacoby et al., 1978; Ring et al., 1980) nor with any 
demographic characteristics such as age or gender. 
  The results from model (2) illustrate factors affecting valuation for both positive and 
negative information. Individuals with higher prior knowledge about irradiation bid less for both 
positive and negative information. They possibly had less incentive to acquire new information 
since they did not need additional information in the decision-making process (Bettman and 
Park, 1980). Interestingly, subjects’ values for positive information were negatively related to 
their perceived risk about the product and positively related to their natural risk attitudes while 
subjects’ values of negative information were in the opposite direction. Subjects in our 
experiment were mostly risk averse and limited to choose only one between positive and 
negative information (i.e. imperfect information). People who are risk averse tend to avoid risky 
situations and choose the safe option under imperfect information, and thus subjects may value 
less for negative information and more for positive information. However when risk was more 
product specific, especially when it was related to food safety, their values for information were 
changed to the opposite direction. Participants were asked to consume one burger at the end of 
the experiment and many participants less preferred an irradiated burger to other alternatives. 
With this non-hypothetical situation, subjects might try to verify potential risk from food 
irradiation.   
 While a subjects level of education appear to play no role in influencing the type of 
information chosen (i.e., bid on) the results indicate that, conditional on which information they 
bid for, more highly educated subjects placed a higher value on negative information and a lower 
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value on positive information. Subjects who have more family members placed lower value on 
both positive and negative information, possibly reflecting their budget constraints.  
 Overall, our results suggest that participants’ choice and value of information are 
influenced by their prior beliefs and other characteristics (i.e. prior knowledge, risk attitude, and 
education level, etc.). In particular, the choice of which type of information to acquire depended 
on prior beliefs about the product, while the valuation of information was influenced by prior 
knowledge about the product, risk perception and preference, and other socio-characteristics. 
Ignoring these factors and behavior of acquiring information in the decision process may cause 
biased results, and prediction of consumer behavior from this environment would be less 
instructive.  
 
Impact of value of information on subsequent valuation. 
 Our second question was to identify whether the value of acquired information had an 
impact on the subsequent valuation of the product. Figure 4-1 plots the absolute change in 
subsequent valuation for the product against the value of information. It shows a positive 
correlation between changes in subsequent valuation and values of information.20 Preliminary 
data analysis also showed relatively high positive correlation (𝜌 = 0.34) between the two 
variables. 
  
                                                 
20 As shown in figure 4-1, three subjects changed their bid by $15, $10.5, and $10 – amounts which are much higher 
than the market price of a regular beef burger. Those three subjects were excluded from the regression analysis. 
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Figure 4-1. Value of information and absolute change in subsequent product valuation 
 
  We estimated the following Tobit model to test whether value of acquired information 
influences subsequent valuation for the product: 
𝐶𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑔 ∗ 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡2 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡3 + 𝜀𝑖     (3) 
where 𝐶𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 is absolute change in subsequent valuation for the product; 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 denotes the 
amount bid for either positive and negative information; 𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑔 is a dummy for negative 
information (𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑔 = 1 if valuation change is caused by negative information); 𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑔 ∗ 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 
is an interaction variable that captures effect of value of negative information on subsequent 
valuation; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡2 and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡3 are dummies for treatment 2 and 3; 𝜀𝑖 is an i.i.d. error term. 
 Table 4-7 provides the estimation results from model (3). The results show that value of 
information has a positive influence on the subsequent change in valuation for the product. Thus, 
participants who place higher value on new information change valuation for the product to a 
greater degree based on that information than participants who place lower value on new 
information. Each individual has different prior knowledge, experience and beliefs about the 
product which causes them to have different needs and values for additional information. A 
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person who has a higher need for additional information may have a stronger incentive to 
process additional information in their decision-making processes which may result in a greater 
change in product valuation. On the other hand, a person with a lower incentive to obtain 
information may have a lower motivation to process new information and that information in 
turn may result in a smaller valuation change.    
Table 4-7. Effect of valuation for information on change in valuation for the product 
 Coefficient Std. Err. 
Value of information 0.36** 0.13 
Dummy for negative information 0.75** 0.32 
Interaction term -0.53 0.42 
Treatment 2 -0.13 0.27 
Treatment 3 0.11 0.27 
Constant -0.20 0.24 
Number of Obs. 76 
  ** denotes statistical significance at 5% level. 
 
 We also investigated whether valuation changes are similar across different types of 
acquired information – i.e. positive versus negative. Subsequent valuation changes are similar for 
both types of information if 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 are both zero in model (3). Using a Wald test, we reject 
the hypothesis of similar valuation changes across different types of information (F = 2.82; p = 
0.06). The results indicate that the value effect of negative information on subsequent valuation 
for the product is larger than the value effect of positive information but we could not find a clear 
positive correlation between value of negative information and change in subsequent valuation. 
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Impact of acquired vs provided information. 
 Our final objective was to investigate whether the effects of acquired information differ 
from those of exogenously provided information.  The literature suggests that people have a 
tendency to first obtain the type of information they valued highest (Meyer, 1982; Hagerty and 
Aaker, 1984). Many experimental auction studies have not considered the fact that participants 
will have higher value for one type of information over another and generally provide 
information without giving participants an opportunity to choose a preferred type of information. 
Ignoring the idea that participants have preferences over what type of information they wish to 
acquire and, importantly, in which order may bias findings related to the effect of information 
since we lose one important part of the decision-making process. Table 4-8 compares the effects 
of acquired and provided information on valuation for the product. The descriptive results 
indicate different effects between acquired and provided information. In particular, the effect of 
acquired information on valuation for the product is bigger than that of exogenously provided 
information. According to mean equality tests, the difference between the effects of acquired and 
provided information was statistically significant for positive information (p = 0.09) but 
differences in pooled and negative information were not statistically significant (p = 0.80 in 
pooled; p = 0.39 in negative information). 
Table 4-8. Effect of acquired/provided information on participants’ bids 
 Pooled Positive Information Negative Information 
Acquired 
Information 
Provided 
Information 
Acquired 
Information 
Provided 
Information 
Acquired 
Information 
Provided 
Information 
Mean* 0.842 (79) 0.741 (79) 0.297 (50) 0.117 (29) 1.780 (29) 1.087 (50) 
Median 0.150 0.100 0.100 0 0.300 0.210 
St. Dev. 2.351 2.672 0.534 0.293 3.669 3.313 
* Entries represent the absolute value of the change in the mean bid. Numbers in parentheses are the number of 
observations. N=79 participants acquired new information prior to R2.  
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 We now examine the effects of acquired and provided information on participants’ 
valuation at the individual level by estimating the following Tobit structure: 
𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑎𝑐𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑎𝑐𝑞 ∗ 𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡2 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡3 + 𝜀𝑖       (4) 
where  𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 is absolute effect (i.e., change in product valuation) of either acquired and 
provided information; 𝐷𝑎𝑐𝑞 is a dummy for acquired information (𝐷𝑎𝑐𝑞=1 if product valuation 
change is caused by acquired information); 𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑔 denotes a dummy for negative information 
(𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑔=1 if product valuation change is caused by negative information); 𝐷𝑎𝑐𝑞 ∗ 𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑔 is an 
interaction term between dummies for acquired and negative information;  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡2 and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑡3 are 
dummies for treatment 2 and 3; 𝜀𝑖 is i.i.d component. 
 To better understand the comparison between the effects of acquired and provided 
information, we also performed a separate analysis for the two different types of information. 
Table 4-9 shows regression results from equation (4). According to the results, the effect of 
acquired information was bigger than that of exogenously provided information in all three 
models. This implies that participants consider the sequence choice of information and they put 
more weight on acquired information than exogenously provided information in the decision-
making process. Our results imply that previous studies potentially underestimated the effect of 
information by exogenously providing information to participants in experimental auctions.  
 We also examined whether effects of acquired positive and negative information are 
similar. Both acquired information have similar effects if 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 are both zero in the model.  
Results from a Wald test (F = 8.96; p = 0.00) rejects the hypothesis of similar effects for both 
types acquired information. The effect of acquired negative information outweighs that of 
acquired positive information which is consistent with findings from previous studies (Fox et al., 
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2002; Tegene et al., 2003; Lusk et al., 2004; Rousu et al., 2004; Corrigan et al., 2009; Lee et al., 
2011). 
Table 4-9. Comparison effects of acquired and provided information 
 Pooled Positive information Negative information 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Dummy for acquired 1.84 (0.92)** 0.55 (0.21)** 0.67 (0.97) 
Dummy for negative 3.15 (0.92)*** - - 
Interaction term -1.19 (1.21) - - 
Treatment 2 -1.51 (0.69)** -0.17 (0.23) -2.68 (1.16)** 
Treatment 3 -0.10 (0.67) 0.004 (0.23) -0.80 (1.13) 
Constant -2.11 (0.90)** -0.41 (0.24)* 1.45 (0.84)* 
Number of Obs. 158 79 79 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 (  ) represents standard error. 
 
 4.5. Conclusion 
 Information acquisition is an important process in decision-making and behaviors of 
acquiring information are heterogeneous across individuals and closely related to their 
characteristics such as prior knowledge, belief, experience, risk attitude, etc. Information is also 
not free for everybody under imperfect information. People choose information based on their 
preferences and assessments of costs and benefits, and are hypothesized to seek first the 
information they most value (Meyer, 1982).   
 Experimental auctions use controlled market environments in an effort to predict 
behavior in the real markets outside the laboratory. We could greatly increase the external 
validity of the findings from experimental auction by reflecting the reality of the world, and 
allowing information acquisition is one of the ways in which experimental environments are able 
to be made more realistic. No previous experimental auction studies have considered information 
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acquisition in their experiments. Our main objective of this study was thus to identify the effect 
of acquired information on participants’ bidding behaviors and to compare it with the traditional 
information treatment (i.e. providing information without restriction). 
 Our results showed that subjects’ behaviors in acquiring different types of information 
are influenced by their heterogeneous characteristics (i.e. prior belief, risk attitude, and prior 
knowledge, etc.). Subjects also placed greater weight on acquired information than provided 
information in their decision-making process. Moreover, individual subjects had different values 
of information which caused different impacts on product valuation. 
 The results generally suggest that auction practitioners should consider the process of 
information acquisition in experimental auctions to obtain better predictions about real world 
behavior. However, to our knowledge this study is a pioneering work in experimental auction 
researches. It may thus have potential limitations that may cause different results from this study. 
Future studies should replicate our study for other population groups and different products to 
test the robustness of our findings. 
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Chapter 5 - General Summary 
 
 Valuation of private goods in a laboratory experimental auction is often conducted in an 
effort to predict consumer behavior in a real market. The laboratory environment should then try 
to replicate to the extent possible factors that will influence consumer behavior in the market 
outside the laboratory. To the extent that the laboratory setting fails to account for such 
influences its predictions may be biased.  In this thesis we examined three design issues - 
allowing negative bids, availability of alternatives (substitutes), and respondent behavior in 
acquiring information – that are often not considered in experimental auction valuation but 
which may influence predictions about market behavior.  
 In the first paper we investigated auction participants’ bidding behavior when negative 
bids were allowed in a private value auction. Most auction studies prefer to bypass or ignore the 
potential complications of allowing negative bids and instead typically truncate bidding at zero. 
We focused on two questions: i) whether subjects with negative values tend to bid strategically – 
either overbidding or underbidding, and ii) the performance of random nth and 5th price auction 
mechanisms when negative bids were allowed. We used an approach that compared values 
elicited in an “endowment” auction that allowed negative bids with values from prior “full-
bidding” auctions for the same two private goods. The results indicate that allowing negative 
bids did not compromise accurate revelation of positive WTP values with either auction 
mechanism.  With negative values however, subjects tended to overbid (i.e., seek additional 
compensation above revealed value for surrendering a preferred good), and that tendency to 
overbid was more pronounced with the random nth price auction. Overall, the results suggest that 
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there is no reason to discourage practitioners from allowing simultaneous positive/negative 
bidding in endowment auctions. 
 The second paper investigated the effect of the availability of varying numbers of 
alternatives (substitutes) for a privately valued good on participants’ bidding behavior. We also 
identified whether the presence of additional alternatives impacted the value of product 
information and/or impacted the effect of new information on product valuations. We especially 
focus on whether subjects in a valuation setting with multiple alternatives tend to bid differently 
compared to those in an environment with fewer or only one alternative (as is typical in many 
endowment type auctions). The results showed: (1) incorporating bids for additional alternatives 
in a private value auction did not have a significant impact on subjects’ bids, but (2) the presence 
of additional alternatives did reduce both the value and impact of product information. The 
results suggest that allowing additional alternatives (substitutes) in a private value auction is still 
valuable even though it does not significantly affect product valuation because it allows auction 
practitioners to avoid potential overstatement of the value and impact of product information.   
 The third paper examined the effect of acquired information on auction participants’ 
bidding behavior. We focused on three questions: i) how subjects choose/value different types of 
information, ii) whether the value of acquired information about a product influences the 
subsequent valuation of the product itself, and iii) whether the effects of acquired information 
differ from those of exogenously provided information. We allowed participants to bid for one 
type of additional information (positive or negative) about the auctioned product (an irradiated 
hamburger) via an auction mechanism and compared product value changes after acquiring 
information with value changes after subsequently providing, at no cost, the alternative 
information they had not already been acquired in the information auction. The results showed: 
81 
(1) subjects’ behavior in acquiring information was influenced by their characteristics (i.e. prior 
beliefs, risk attitudes, prior knowledge, etc.), (2) subjects placed greater weight on acquired 
information than on exogenously provided information in their decision-making process, and (3) 
individual subjects had different values of information which caused different impacts on 
product valuation. 
 An experimental auction is a popular method to estimate consumer value of new products 
and product attributes. Experimental economists have utilized auctions to predict market 
responses, to investigate acceptability of new products, and to investigate the impact of 
information on product valuation.  Since they were first introduced, experimental valuation 
procedures have evolved through investigation of the effects of numerous design features and, 
compared to two decades ago, today’s experiments are, for example, more likely to feature: a) 
up-front payments to participants rather than payment at the conclusion of the experiment, b) 
fewer rounds of bidding, c) random nth or 4th or 5th price auctions rather than a 2nd price auction 
in an effort to better engage off-margin bidders, and d) cheap-talk scripts to remind participants 
about budget constraints. On some other design issues there is as yet no broad agreement – for 
example on the choice of full-price versus endowment designs.  This thesis examined three 
elements in experimental auction design – allowing negative bids, incorporating varying 
numbers of alternatives (substitutes) for the auctioned good, and subject behavior in acquiring 
new information – in an effort to provide insights to guide future experimental auction work. 
First, our findings suggest that when participants have divergent perceptions about whether an 
auctioned good is superior or inferior to an endowed good, there is nothing to lose by allowing 
simultaneous positive and negative bidding instead of truncating bids at zero. The negative 
bidding concept is fairly readily explained to participants and, for positive values at least, 
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allowing negative bids does not appear to compromise the demand revealing properties of a 4th 
price auction. Negative values may be overstated however, particularly with a random nth auction 
mechanism.     
 Second, we find that the number of alternatives that subjects bid on in an endowment 
auction does not appear to significantly impact bids. We want to stress that the design we tested 
did not allow the alternatives to be treated as substitutes for one another – because participants 
were not allowed to choose which among the alternatives they bid for would actually be 
purchased.  Thus the finding of no impact on bids is not a rejection of the idea that the 
availability of substitutes influences demand. Economic theory and other experimental studies 
(and perhaps common sense) all agree that the availability of substitutes does impact the height 
of the demand curve (i.e., influences willingness-to-pay values). What our finding means 
however is that this particular aspect of the context in which bids are elicited does not appear to 
have a bearing on revealed values. The finding is important – the fact that bids are robust to 
variation in the number of simultaneously-valued similar goods is good news. It means in effect, 
that, in an endowment auction, it doesn’t matter whether one elicits bids to exchange for just one 
or as many as four alternatives – if each alternative has an equal probability of being the one that 
is ultimately sold to the participant then the number of alternatives effectively does not matter.   
 Third however, our findings illustrate the idea that consumers have preferences when it 
comes to acquiring information about new products that are unfamiliar to them.  In this regard, 
three findings are particularly relevant – one, that the effect of information on subsequent 
valuation of the good being auctioned depends on the value placed on the information itself, two, 
that information acquired via a bid process appears to have a greater impact on subsequent 
valuation than information provided at no cost by the experimenter, and three, that the presence 
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of multiple alternatives in the auction environment appears to mitigate the effect of new 
information on valuation (as if those alternatives were substitutes for the good being valued).  
Those findings, and their implications, should be kept in mind in studies that seek to quantify the 
effect of new information 
 So, the final advice is quite simple. If some consumers have negative values for the good 
being auctioned – go ahead and allow negative bids. And if you are investigating the effect of 
new information on values, be mindful that consumers have preferences with regard to the type 
of information they seek and consider a design that incorporates bids for multiple alternatives.   
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Appendix A - Experimental Design for Chapter 221 
INSTRUCTIONS                     
 
 You are about to participate in an experimental auction.  You will also be asked to complete a short 
survey.  Please follow all instructions carefully.   
 You will receive $5 for participating in this experiment.  During the auction you may purchase or sell 
goods. Accordingly, your take home income may be greater or less than $5.  
 When bidding in the auction, you are requested not to reveal your bids to any other participant.  Any 
communication between bidders will result in a request to withdraw from the experiment.   
 You will be provided with an I.D. number. Please write this number where requested on the survey 
instrument and on all bidding sheets.  
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 We need your signed consent if you are to participate in this experiment.  Your participation is 
completely voluntary and you may withdraw from the experiment at any time without prejudice to 
you.  Results from the experiment will be reported in aggregate form and will not be associated with 
any individual participant.  Any names associated with the experiment will be deleted upon 
completion.  
 
 If you consent to participate, please sign and date the consent form below.  On the following page, 
your address and SSN is required to account for our distribution of funds.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 I have read the consent form statement and agree to act as subject in this experimental auction, with 
the understanding that I can withdraw at any time without prejudice to me.  
 
                                       /        /          
 Signature                        Date 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 We only present the design for the 4th price auction. The design for the random nth price auction is equivalent to 
this design except the auction mechanism.  
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This information is required to account for our distribution of funds  
 
 
 
Name:         
 
 
SSN:         
 
 
Street Address:       
 
City:         
 
State:        ZIP Code:   
 
 
Phone         OR E-mail:     
 
 
 
I hereby certify that I have received a $5.00 payment for my participation in an Economic 
Experiment at Kansas State University on December 3, 2013. 
 
 
Signature:      Date:       
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I.D. #    
 
To begin, we would like to collect some background information about you.  We would like to 
remind you that all information will be treated as confidential and cannot be connected to you. 
Data will be reported only in aggregate form – i.e., as group averages.  
 
1. What gender are you?  Male ____ Female ____ 
 
2. In what year were you born?   19_____   
 
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (Circle one) 
  Some high school        College graduate 
  High school graduate       Some post graduate 
  Some college        Graduate degree 
  
4. Have you ever lived or worked on a farm or ranch? (Please circle) 
  Yes  No 
5. Answer the following question by circling a number, 1 through 5. 
  
 I am cautious in trying new and different things.   
   1  2  3  4  5  
           strongly disagree                                      neutral                   strongly agree 
 
6. Do any children living in your household? (Please circle) 
 
Under age 6 yes no 
Age 6 to 18  yes  no 
 
7. How frequently, on average, do you consume the following? 
 
 beef   meals per week  OR     meals per month   
 pork   meals per week  OR     meals per month   
 chicken   meals per week  OR     meals per month   
 fish   meals per week  OR     meals per month   
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8. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being "not at all concerned" and 5 being "very concerned" how 
concerned are you about the safety of the food you buy?       
 
9. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being 'not at all concerned' and 5 being 'very concerned', indicate your 
level of concern about how each of the following affects food safety. 
 
Item 
Not at all 
concerned 
   Very 
Concerned 
Spoilage 1 2 3 4 5 
Pesticides / Herbicides 1 2 3 4 5 
Chemicals 1 2 3 4 5 
Additives / Preservatives 1 2 3 4 5 
Pollution 1 2 3 4 5 
Bacteria – e.g., Salmonella, E.coli 1 2 3 4 5 
Bugs/pests/rats 1 2 3 4 5 
Use of antibiotics 1 2 3 4 5 
Irradiation of food 1 2 3 4 5 
Animal growth enhancers 1 2 3 4 5 
Genetic engineering/biotechnology 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Food Safety and E. coli 
 
You may be aware of the possibility of ground beef being contaminated with bacteria such as E.coli.  
These bacteria can cause food poisoning if the meat is not properly handled and cooked.  Scientists 
estimate that perhaps one hamburger in every thousand may contain E.coli.  But, because proper 
cooking kills bacteria, less than one hamburger in every million causes an illness from E.coli.   
 
When testing reveals that ground beef may contain E. coli, the product is recalled from the market to 
protect consumers.  
 
10. Prior to this survey, were you aware that hamburgers or ground beef could be 
contaminated with E.coli bacteria that could cause food poisoning.  (Check only one).   
 
     Yes, I was aware that hamburgers or ground beef might contain E.coli.  
    No, I was not aware that hamburgers or ground beef might contain E.coli. 
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11. If a large quantity of ground beef had recently been recalled from supermarkets in your 
area because of the risk of contamination with E.coli, how do you think this might 
influence your purchasing decisions?  (Check only one). 
  I would probably stop purchasing ground beef/burgers for a few weeks 
  I would probably stop purchasing ground beef/burgers for several months 
  I would probably switch from supermarket ground beef to a locally produced source 
  I would probably not change my purchasing habits 
  Other. Please explain:          
 
Even though the risk of illness from ground beef is very low, a process called food 
irradiation can decrease it even further.  
Food Irradiation: Food irradiation is a process that uses electro-magnetic radiation to kill 
bacteria in hamburger. It has been shown to kill 100% of the E.coli bacteria that may be 
present in ground beef.  The process of food irradiation has been approved by the USDA.   
 
12. Which of the following best describes your knowledge of food irradiation before receiving 
this survey?  (Check only one). 
  _______ I had never heard of food irradiation until now 
  _______ I had heard of food irradiation, but did not know much about it 
  _______ I knew something about food irradiation 
  _______ I knew quite a lot about food irradiation 
 
13. Imagine that you are in your local grocery store to purchase ground beef.  You can choose 
between two types of ground beef that both cost the same.  One is regular ground beef that has 
not been treated with irradiation. The chance that this ground beef contains E.coli is about 1 in 
1,000, and the risk of becoming ill if it has E.coli is about 1 in a million.  The other ground beef 
was treated with irradiation. The irradiation treatment killed all of the E.coli bacteria that may 
have been in the meat. The meat is guaranteed not to contain E.coli.  . 
Which ground beef would you buy?   If both cost the same, I would buy (Check only one). 
      Regular ground beef    Irradiated ground beef  
 
14. My willingness to accept food safety risk when eating food products, I am…. 
   1                    2                    3                 4                 5 
 not at all willing                a little willing                  very willing 
 
15.  I rarely think about food safety when eating food products 
   1                    2                    3                 4                  5 
Strongly disagree                    Neutral                     Strongly agree 
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INSTRUCTIONS, Stage 1                           I.D. #             
 
Please examine the Package of Trail Mix and Package of Dried Fruit and indicate which one 
you prefer. 
 
  I prefer the Package of Trail Mix   
  I prefer the Package of Dried Fruit   
  I like them both equally well    
 
We will now conduct an auction for both goods.  Only one of the goods, determined using a coin-
toss, will actually be sold:  heads - Trail Mix; tails - Dried Fruit.  The randomly selected item will be 
sold to the highest bidder for an amount equal to the 2nd highest bid for that item.   
 
For example, let’s say that Trail Mix are chosen, and the top 3 bids for Trail Mix are $3.85, $2.00, 
and $1.80.  The Trail Mix will be sold to the high bidder and he/she will pay $2.00.  Note that this is 
not a hypothetical exercise – an exchange will be made and money will change hands. 
 
First, let’s practice with an auction for this small candy bar.  I will sell it to the highest bidder, for 
an amount equal to the 2nd highest bid.  In case of a tie for the high bid, we will toss a coin to 
determine the high bidder, and the 2nd high bid will be the same as the high bid.  For example, if the 
top 3 bids are 20c, 20c, and 15c, we will toss a coin to determine the winning bidder and they will 
pay 20c for the candy bar.   
 
Note that in this type of auction you are better off if you bid an amount that exactly equal to the 
maximum amount you would be willing to pay (WTP) for the good.  Let’s say your maximum WTP 
is 25c – if you bid only 20c you might lose the chance to buy the candy bar at a price you would 
have been happy to pay. On the other hand, if you bid more than your maximum WTP you may end 
up buying the candy bar and paying too much for it. 
 
Submit your bid for the candy bar below. Don’t forget to put your ID number on the sheet above. 
 
 
 My bid for the small candy bar is              
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Stage 1                   I.D. #             
 
 
Your bids for the Package of Trail Mix and the Package of Dried Fruit  
Remember – only one of the 2 items will be sold. Price will be the 2nd highest bid. 
 
  
My bid for the Package of Trail Mix is              
  
 
 
 
My bid for the Package of Dried Fruit is              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
INSTRUCTIONS, Stage 2                I.D. #             
 
In the next set of auctions you will be given one good and asked how much you would be willing to 
pay (or how much you would be willing to accept) to exchange it for another good.  Only one of the 
auctions will be binding – determined by drawing a number from an envelope.  For example, we 
might conduct these 3 auctions: 
Auction A: You have an oven mitt and are bidding to exchange it for a coffee mug.  
Auction B: You have a pen and are bidding to exchange it for a pencil.  
Auction C: You have a calculator and are bidding to exchange it for a stapler. 
If auction B is selected, everyone will own a pen, and the winning bidder(s) in the auction will then 
exchange it for a pencil.  Nobody will receive an oven mitt or a calculator.   
In our earlier candy bar auction, the winning bidder paid the 2nd highest price.  In the next set of 
auctions the top N bidders will pay the N+1st highest price (e.g., if N is 2, then the two high bidders 
will pay the 3rd highest price).  N may or may not be known to you before you make your bid. 
Example:   
Assume Auction A was conducted with 7 bidders.  N was 4, so the top 4 bidders would make the 
exchange and pay the 5th highest price.  Let’s say that 3 of the 7 bidders preferred the coffee mug 
and their bids were $0.75, $0.55 and $0.25 to exchange the oven mitt for the coffee mug.  One 
person liked the oven mitt and coffee mug equally well – they didn’t care which one they ended up 
with, so they bid zero.  The remaining 3 bidders all preferred to keep the oven mitt and would need 
to be paid to make the exchange.  Their bids were -$0.50, -$1.00, and -$1.00 – i.e., 2 of them would 
need to be paid $1.00 to make the exchange, the other $0.50.  Bids are shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Result.  The top 4 bidders, which includes the zero bid, exchange the oven mitt for the coffee mug 
and they each receive $0.50 for the exchange.   
 
Questions:  What if N = 2?  What if N = 5?   
 
Next, we’ll have another practice auction using candy bars. 
 $0.75 -$1.00 (2) $0.00 
Amount willing-to-pay Amount willing-to-accept 
 $0.55 -$0.50  $0.25 
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Practice auction:   Milky Way  Snickers   I.D. #            
 
You have a Milky Way and an opportunity to exchange it for a Snickers bar. N will be 4, so the top 
4 bidders will make the exchange, and will pay the 5th highest price. 
The top N bidders will make the exchange, and will pay the N + 1st highest price.  As in the earlier 
candy bar, a real exchange will take place – this is not a hypothetical exercise.  
Again, you will be better off bidding the maximum amount you would be willing to pay (WTP) for 
the exchange, or, if you prefer to keep the Milky Way, the minimum you would accept to make the 
exchange.  For example, let’s say you prefer the Milky Way and the minimum you would accept to 
exchange it for a Snickers is 30c.  If you bid -$1.00 you may lose the chance to make the exchange 
at 30c.  But if you bid -$0.10 you may end up making the exchange and receiving less than 30c.   
Submit your bid below.  Write either:  
a) the maximum you would pay to exchange the Milky Way for the Snickers (if you prefer 
the Snickers)  
b) the minimum you would accept to exchange the Milky Way for the Snickers (if you prefer 
the Milky Way) 
c) ZERO – if you like the Milky Way and Snickers equally well.  
 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the Milky Way for the Snickers is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the Milky Way for the Snickers is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
Please also mark your bid on the line below. You may bid any amount. It doesn’t need to be one of 
the prices marked on the line.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
Remember, that in the auctions that follow, only one auction will be binding. The 
binding auction will be determined by drawing a number from an envelope. 
 
 $1.00 -$1.00 $0.00 
Amount willing-to-pay Amount willing-to-accept 
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Auction A: Package of Trail Mix  Package of Dried Fruit I.D. #    
 
You have a Package of Trail Mix and an opportunity to exchange it for a Package of Dried Fruit.   
N will be 4, so the top 4 bidders will make the exchange, and will pay the 5th highest price.  If this 
auction is selected to be binding, you will receive a package of Trail Mix, but may then end up 
exchanging it for Dried Fruit.   
 
Submit your bid below.  Write either:  
a) the maximum you would pay to exchange the Package of Trail Mix for the Package of 
Dried Fruit (if you prefer the Dried Fruit)  
b) the minimum you would accept to exchange the Package of Trail Mix for the Package of 
Dried Fruit (if you prefer the Trail Mix)   
c) ZERO – if you like the Trail Mix and Dried Fruit equally well.  
 
 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the Package of Trail Mix for the Package of Dried 
Fruit is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the Package of Trail Mix for the Package of Dried 
Fruit is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
 
Please also mark your bid on the line below. You may bid any amount. It doesn’t need to be one of 
the prices marked on the line.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 $1.00 -$1.00 $0.00 
Amount willing-to-pay Amount willing-to-accept 
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Auction B: Package of Dried Fruit  Package of Trail Mix I.D. #    
 
You have a Package of Dried Fruit and an opportunity to exchange it for a Package of Trail Mix.   
N will be 4, so the top 4 bidders will make the exchange, and will pay the 5th highest price.  If this 
auction is selected to be binding, you will receive a package of Dried Fruit, but may then end up 
exchanging it for Trail Mix.   
 
Submit your bid below.  Write either:  
a) the maximum you would pay to exchange the Package of Dried Fruit for the Package of 
Trail Mix (if you prefer the Trail Mix)  
b) the minimum you would accept to exchange the Package of Dried Fruit for the Package of 
Trail Mix (if you prefer the Dried Fruit)   
c) ZERO – if you like the Dried Fruit and Trail Mix equally well.  
 
 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the Package of Dried Fruit for the Package of Trail 
Mix is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the Package of Dried Fruit for the Package of Trail 
Mix is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
 
Please also mark your bid on the line below. You may bid any amount. It doesn’t need to be one of 
the prices marked on the line.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 $1.00 -$1.00 $0.00 
Amount willing-to-pay Amount willing-to-accept 
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INSTRUCTIONS, Stage 3            I.D. #             
 
In this part of the auction we will give you an opportunity to sell the product that you have just 
acquired – either the package of Dried Fruit or the package of Trail Mix.   
 
Please check here to indicate which item you have: 
 
I own a Package of Dried Fruit    
 
I own a Package of Trail Mix     
 
 
Please indicate below the minimum amount you would accept in exchange for the product you 
now possess.  We will draw a random price between zero and $3.00.  If the amount you are 
willing to accept is below that random number you will sell your item for the random price.  
If the amount you are willing to accept is above the random number you will keep your item.   
 
For example, if you are willing to accept $2.10 and the randomly drawn price is $2.50 you will 
sell your item for $2.50.  If the randomly drawn price is $1.70, you would not sell your item.  
 
 
 
The minimum I am willing to accept for my item is     
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Appendix B - Experimental Design for Chapter 3 and 422 
Introduction and Consent Form 
 
 You are about to participate in an experimental auction.  You will also be asked to complete 
a short survey.  Please follow all instructions carefully.   
 
 You will receive $ 50 for participating. During the experiment you may purchase or sell 
goods. Accordingly, your take home income may be greater or less than $ 50.  
 
 When bidding in an auction, you are requested not to reveal your bids to any other 
participant.  Any communication between bidders will result in a request to withdraw from 
the experiment.   
 
 You will be provided with an I.D. number. Please write this number where requested on the 
survey instrument and on all bidding sheets.  
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 We need your signed consent if you are to participate in this experiment.  Your participation 
is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from the experiment at any time without 
prejudice to you.  Results from the experiment will be reported in aggregate form and will 
not be associated with any individual participant.  Any names associated with the 
experiment will be deleted upon completion.  
 
 If you consent to participate, please sign and date the consent form below.  On the following 
page, your address and SSN is required to account for our distribution of funds.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 I have read the consent form statement and agree to participate in this experiment, with the 
understanding that I can withdraw at any time without prejudice to me.  
 
 
                                       /        /          
 Signature                        Date 
 
 
                                                 
22 We only present the experimental design for treatment 3. Designs for treatment 1 and 2 are equivalent to treatment 
3 except the number of alternatives presented in the text. 
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This information is required to account for our distribution of funds  
 
 
Name:         
 
 
SSN:         
 
 
Street Address:       
 
City:         
 
State:        ZIP Code:    
 
 
Phone         OR E-mail:     
 
 
 
I hereby certify that I have received a $ 50 payment for my participation in an Economic 
Experiment at Kansas State University. 
 
 
Signature:      Date:        
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I.D. #     
 
We appreciate your participation in this survey. We are interested in your perceptions and opinions about 
meat.  This survey is being conducted as part of a graduate student research project at Kansas State 
University.  This survey is in multiple-choice and fill-in-the-blank format. 
Any information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and used only for the purposes of this 
research.  Your individual responses are anonymous and you are in no way identified in the survey.  
If you feel any question is too personal, you do not have to answer it. 
   
1. What best describes your gender?  Male ____ Female ____ 
 
2. In what year were you born?   19_____   
 
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed?  (Circle one). 
    Some high school                     College graduate 
                            High school graduate                       Some post graduate 
                     Some college                                    Graduate degree 
                           
4. How many people in your household are in the following age categories? (Including 
yourself)                                    
Age categories Number 
Age 5 and younger ____ 
Age 6 to 17 ____ 
Age 18 to 39 ____ 
Age 40 to 54 ____ 
Age 55 and above 
 
____ 
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5. We recognize that income is private information. We ask about it because income influences 
food purchases and it is important for us to be able to categorize responses by income 
ranges. This information will be kept strictly confidential and will never be linked to your 
name, nor made available to anyone outside the research team.  
What was your household’s total pre-tax income from all sources in 2014?  
(Circle one). 
1. Less than $20,000                
2.  $20,001 – 30,000                
3.  $30,001 – 40,000                
4.  $40,001 – 50,000                
5.  $50,001 – 75,000                
6.  $75,001 – 100,000                
7. $100,001 – 125,000                
                          8.          $125,001 – 150,000                
                          9.          More than $150,000 
 
6.  Approximately how much does your household spend on food consumed at home and 
away from home during a typical week? (Circle one). 
      1. Less than $60 per week 
      2. $61 - $90 per week                                               
      3. $91 - $120 per week 
      4. $121 - $150 per week 
      5. More than $150 per week 
 
7. Approximately how often does your household consume the following products? (Check 
one bubble for each product). 
 At least 
once a 
week 
2-3 times a 
month 
About once 
a month 
Less than 
once a 
month 
Never 
Ground beef/ 
Hamburger 
 
Steak 
 
Chicken 
 
Pork 
 
Fish 
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8. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “least considered” and 5 being “most considered”, 
what level of consideration do you give to the following factors when purchasing meat? 
(Circle one number for each factor) 
 Least 
considered 
   Most 
considered 
Price  
 
Food Safety  
 
Brand 
 
Fat/Cholesterol  
 
Quality grade 
 
Freshness 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
 
9.  Have you, or has anybody in your household ever had food poisoning?  
(Circle one) 
1. Yes 
2. No                                               
3. Maybe, unsure 
4. Don’t know 
 
If yes, check which, if any, of the following foods you suspected caused food poisoning: 
  Pork 
  Poultry 
   Beef 
  Lamb/Mutton 
  Fish/seafood 
  Fruit 
  Vegetables 
  Other. Please list:            
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10.   On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being "not at all concerned" and 5 being "very concerned",       
  how concerned are you about the safety of the following foods?   
 Not at all 
concerned 
   Very 
concerned 
Ground beef 
/Hamburger 
 
Steak 
 
Chicken 
 
Pork 
 
Fish 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
2 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
3 
 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
4 
 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
5 
 
 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
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11.    On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being ‘not at all concerned’ and 5 being ‘very concerned’,     
   indicate your level of concern about how each of the following affects the safety of     
   meat products. 
    Not at all 
concerned 
   Very 
concerned 
 
Spoilage 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
    4 
 
5 
 
Don’t 
know 
 
Pesticides/Herbicides 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
    4 
 
5 
 
Don’t 
know 
 
Vaccination of food animals 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
    4 
 
5 
 
Don’t 
know 
 
Additives/Preservatives 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
    4 
 
5 
 
Don’t 
know 
 
Food processing technologies (e.g. 
heat or pressure treatment) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
    4 
 
5 
 
Don’t 
know 
 
Bacteria  (e.g. Salmonella, E.coli) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
    4 
 
5 
 
Don’t 
know 
 
Use of antibiotics in animal 
agriculture 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
    4 
 
5 
 
Don’t 
know 
 
Irradiation of food 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
    4 
 
5 
 
Don’t 
know 
 
Animal growth enhancers (e.g. 
artificial hormones) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
    4 
 
5 
 
Don’t 
know 
 
Genetic engineering 
/biotechnology/cloning 
1 2 3     4 5 
Don’t 
know 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
12. When you purchase meat, you may take several things into consideration to assess 
safety. For meat purchases, please select the 3 most important factors you consider as 
indicators of food safety.  
(1 = most important, 2 = 2nd most important, 3 = 3rd most important). 
  Brand name 
  Visual inspection of product (e.g. color, freshness) 
  Labelled organic 
  Food safety assurance (e.g. government inspected) 
  Purchased from reputable store 
  Product smell 
  Labelled natural 
  Labelled traceable to farm 
  Price level 
  Past experience with the product 
  “Sell by” or “Best by” date 
  Others. Please list:           
 
 
According to The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 1 in 6 Americans (or 
48 million people) gets sick, 128,000 are hospitalized, and 3,000 die of foodborne diseases every 
year.  In 2014, there were 94 food recalls involving beef, pork, and poultry, of which 16 were a 
result of contamination with bacteria such as E.coli.  
E.coli. can cause food poisoning if meat is not properly handled and cooked. Scientists estimate 
that perhaps one hamburger in every thousand may contain E.coli.  But, because proper cooking 
kills bacteria, less than one hamburger in every million causes an illness from E.coli. 
 
 
13. Prior to this survey, were you aware that hamburgers or ground beef could be 
contaminated with E.coli bacteria that could cause food poisoning.  (Check only one).  
   Yes, I was aware that hamburgers or ground beef might contain E.coli.  
  No, I was not aware that hamburgers or ground beef might contain E.coli. 
 
14. How concerned are you about contracting harmful bacteria such as E.coli when 
consuming hamburgers or ground beef? 
 
                     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
       not at all concerned                                                                very concerned 
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15. If a large quantity of ground beef had recently been recalled from supermarkets in your 
area because of the risk of contamination with E.coli, how do you think this might 
influence your purchasing decisions?  (check only one) 
 
   I would probably stop purchasing ground beef/burgers for a few weeks 
  I would probably stop purchasing ground beef/burgers for several months 
  I would probably switch from supermarket ground beef to a locally produced source 
  I would probably not change my purchasing habits 
  Other. Please explain:          
 
 
16. On a scale of 1-10, where 1 is ‘strongly disagree’ and where 10 is ‘strongly agree’, please 
indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements? 
 
 
Consuming meat products always involves some level of risk from harmful bacteria.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Strongly Disagree          Strongly Agree 
 
 
Bacteria such as E. coli pose a great risks of illness to my family and me.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Strongly Disagree          Strongly Agree 
 
 
Meat processors need to implement additional safeguards to reduce the risk of foodborne 
disease to consumers.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Strongly Disagree          Strongly Agree 
 
 
My family and I need to be careful when preparing meat products at home in order to reduce 
the risk of foodborne disease. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Strongly Disagree          Strongly Agree 
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17.  How much ability does each of the following parties have to influence and assure the 
safety of meat products? 
(1 = very low influence on safety, 5 = very high influence on safety) 
 Very low    Very high  
Rancher/Cattle feeder 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
No 
opinion 
 
Meat  processor 
(slaughter plant) 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
No 
opinion 
 
Wholesaler/Distributor 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
No 
opinion 
 
Retail grocer 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
No 
opinion 
 
Restaurant 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
No 
opinion 
 
Consumer 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
No 
opinion 
 
Government 
inspectors 
1 2 3 4 5 
No 
opinion 
 
 
Some animal production processes can reduce the risk of illness associated with 
meat products. 
 
 
18. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being 'Nothing' and 5 being 'A great deal', how much do you 
know about the following? 
 Nothing    A great deal 
Livestock 
Vaccines 
 
Direct-Fed 
Microbials 
(Probiotics) 
 
Food Irradiation 
 
High Pressure 
Processing (HPP) 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
5 
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19. Where have you heard about production processes such as animal vaccines, direct-fed 
microbials, food irradiation, and high pressure processing? (Circle any that apply) 
1. News media outlets (e.g. newspapers, radio/television news) 
2. Government agencies (e.g. USDA, FDA, etc)                                               
3. Non-government organizations (e.g. Greenpeace, Humane Society) 
4. Private food companies (e.g. Tyson, Smithfield, Hormel) 
5.   University publications 
6. Others (please specify) _____________________________________ 
 
20. On a scale from 1 to 5, please indicate your level of trust in the following sources for 
providing accurate information about production processes such as animal vaccines, 
direct-fed microbials, food irradiation, and high pressure processing.  
(1 = very low level of trust, 5 = very high level of trust) 
 
 Very low    Very high  
News media 
outlets (e.g. 
newspapers, 
radio/television 
news) 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
No  
opinion 
 
Government 
agencies (e.g. 
USDA, FDA) 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
No  
opinion 
 
Non-government 
organizations 
(e.g. Greenpeace, 
Humane Society) 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
No  
opinion 
 
Private food 
companies (e.g. 
Tyson, 
Smithfield, 
Hormel) 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
No  
opinion 
 
 
Academic 
Universities 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
No  
opinion 
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In this section we provide brief descriptions of some food production processes that can 
reduce the risk of illness from ground beef.  Descriptions are based on information from 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture.   
 
 
 Food Irradiation 
 
Food is irradiated in special processing facilities where it is exposed to an electron beam or X-rays 
generated using electricity, or to gamma rays emitted by cobalt-60. Food irradiation controls spoilage 
and eliminates harmful foodborne bacteria. The result is similar to pasteurization. The fundamental 
difference between food irradiation and pasteurization is the source of the energy used to destroy the 
bacteria. While conventional pasteurization uses heat, irradiation uses energy from ionizing radiation.  
 
 
 
 Direct-Fed Microbials (Probiotics) 
 
The terms direct-fed microbial and probiotic are used interchangeably. They are animal feed additives 
that contain microbial species that are considered to be non-pathogenic normal flora. A probiotic is 
defined as “a live microbial feed supplement which beneficially affects the host by improving its 
intestinal microbial balance” Direct-fed microbials or probiotics can potentially improve resistance to 
disease, reduce shedding of pathogens, increase intestinal immunity, reduce disease symptoms, and 
improve animal health. 
 
 
 
 High Pressure Processing (HPP) 
 
High Pressure Processing (HPP) is an antimicrobial treatment for meat and poultry products.  HPP 
subjects food to elevated pressures, with or without the addition of heat, to inactivate microorganisms 
and extend microbiological shelf life. Product processed with HPP is placed in a sealed flexible 
container. The flexible container is placed in a basket or barrel and moved to a high-pressure chamber 
filled with a pressure-transmitting fluid (usually water) that does not come in contact with the food 
product. The high pressure kills or damages harmful foodborne bacteria.  
 
 
 
 Vaccination 
 
Vaccinations are widely used to prevent disease and maintain health in livestock. Vaccinations can 
improve overall herd health resulting in decreased death loss and improved productivity. Vaccination 
has also been proven to be effective in reducing harmful bacteria in cattle. Optimum vaccination 
programs vary by region, disease exposure, facilities, and other herd-specific variables.  
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21. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being 'Totally unacceptable' and 5 being 'Perfectly 
acceptable', please indicate your level of acceptance of the following ….. 
 Totally 
unacceptable 
   Perfectly 
acceptable 
Use of vaccines in 
animal production 
 
Use of direct-fed 
microbials in 
animal production 
 
Use of irradiation 
in meat processing 
 
Use of high 
pressure 
processing for 
meat 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
22. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being 'Very unsafe' and 5 being 'Very safe', how would you 
rate the safety of.... 
 Very 
Unsafe 
   Very  
Safe 
Meat from cattle 
vaccinated against 
E.coli 
 
Meat from cattle 
treated with direct-
fed microbials 
 
Meat treated with 
irradiation 
 
Meat treated with 
high pressure 
processing 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
5 
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Please carefully read the following paragraphs before answering the remaining questions. 
     The experience from surveys is that people often state a higher willingness to pay for an item than 
the amount they would truly be willing to pay for it in an actual purchasing situation. For instance, in a 
recent study, 80% of people said they would buy a new food product, similar to those you will be asked 
about below, but when a grocery store actually stocked the product, only 43% of people actually 
bought the new product when they had to pay for it. This difference (43% vs 80%) is what we refer to 
as hypothetical bias.  
     Accordingly, it is important that you respond to the following questions as if you were actually 
facing these exact choices in a restaurant, i.e., keeping in mind that paying more for a product means 
that you would have less money available for other purchases. 
 
       Imagine that you are in a restaurant and you are about to purchase a beef burger from  
       the lunch menu. Four types of beef burgers are available to you in this restaurant.  
       The choices are: 
a) A regular beef burger – the menu price is $3.95 
b) A beef burger that was treated with irradiation.  
c) A beef burger from animals treated with direct-fed microbials (DFM).  
d) A beef burger that was treated with high pressure processing (HPP).  
 
All treatments (i.e. irradiation, DFM, and HPP) were used to kill/reduce any E.coli bacteria that 
may have been present in the meat.  
 
We would like to know that maximum you would be willing to pay for each of the alternatives to the 
regular burger.  For any alternative that you like better than the regular burger, the highest price you 
would pay should be above $3.95, and for any alternative that you like less than the regular burger, the 
highest price you would pay should be less than $3.95. 
 
 
23.1 With the regular burger costing $3.95, the most I would pay for the burger that was treated       
             with irradiation would be   $_____   
 
 
23.2 With the regular burger costing $3.95, the most I would pay for the burger from animals  
             treated with DFM would be   $_____  
 
 
23.3 With the regular burger costing $3.95, the most I would pay for the burger that was treated  
             with HPP would be   $_____  
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I.D. #     
In this exercise you have an opportunity to earn some extra money.  
Below, you are asked to make 9 decisions between Lottery A and Lottery B.   
At the end of the experiment we will use drawings from two envelopes to randomly pick up 
one person from the group and one decision from rows 2 to 10 in the table.  
The winner will receive their choice of Lottery A or Lottery B for the selected row.  
To illustrate, in decision row 1, Lottery A provides a 100% chance of winning $8.00 while 
Lottery B provides a 100% chance of winning $1.00.  Because most people would prefer to 
win the larger amount, they would choose Lottery A. Similarly, in question 11, most people 
would choose Lottery B.   
For rows 2, 3, etc, please indicate which lottery, A or B, you would prefer.    
 
Decision 
Row  
Lottery A Lottery B 
Your 
preference 
1 
0% chance of $10.00, 
100% chance of $8.00 
0% chance of $19.00, 
100% chance of $1.00 
A 
2 
10% chance of $10.00, 
90% chance of $8.00 
10% chance of $19.00, 
90% chance of $1.00 
 
3 
20% chance of $10.00, 
80% chance of $8.00 
20% chance of $19.00, 
80% chance of $1.00 
 
4 
30% chance of $10.00, 
70% chance of $8.00 
30% chance of $19.00, 
70% chance of $1.00 
 
5 
40% chance of $10.00, 
60% chance of $8.00 
40% chance of $19.00, 
60% chance of $1.00 
 
6 
50% chance of $10.00, 
50% chance of $8.00 
50% chance of $19.00, 
50% chance of $1.00 
 
7 
60% chance of $10.00, 
40% chance of $8.00 
60% chance of $19.00, 
40% chance of $1.00 
 
8 
70% chance of $10.00, 
30% chance of $8.00 
70% chance of $19.00, 
30% chance of $1.00 
 
9 
80% chance of $10.00, 
20% chance of $8.00 
80% chance of $19.00, 
20% chance of $1.00 
 
10 
90% chance of $10.00, 
10% chance of $8.00 
90% chance of $19.00, 
10% chance of $1.00 
 
11 
100% chance of $10.00, 
0% chance of $8.00 
100% chance of $19.00, 
0% chance of $1.00 
B 
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I.D. #     
 
In the survey you completed before the lottery preference exercise you were asked about your 
willingness to pay for different burgers.  We will now repeat that question, but in a slightly 
different way.   
 
Imagine you had a regular beef burger and had the opportunity to exchange it for one of 
three alternatives:   
 
a) A beef burger that was treated with irradiation.  
b) A beef burger from animals treated with direct-fed microbials (DFM).  
c) A beef burger that was treated with high pressure processing (HPP).  
 
For any alternative you like better than the regular burger, indicate the maximum you would be 
willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for that preferred burger.   
For any alternative you like less than the regular burger, indicate the minimum you would be 
willing to accept to exchange the regular burger for that less preferred burger.   
 
Note, you are not being asked how much you would pay for a burger, but how much you would 
pay (or need to be paid) to exchange one for another.  If you like the regular and alternative 
burger equally, check zero as the amount you would be WTP/WTA for an exchange.  
 
 
1) Irradiated beef burger 
The most I would pay to exchange the regular burger for the irradiated burger is     
OR, the minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the irradiated burger is   
OR, I like both equally so my WTP/WTA for an exchange is ZERO. (Check here)                 
 
 
2) Burger from animals treated with direct-fed microbials (DFM) 
The most I would pay to exchange the regular burger for the DFM burger is     
OR, the minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the DFM burger is    
OR, I like both equally so my WTP/WTA for an exchange is ZERO. (Check here)                
 
 
3) High pressure processed (HPP) burger  
The most I would pay to exchange the regular burger for the HPP burger is      
OR, the minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the HPP burger is    
OR, I like both equally so my WTP/WTA for an exchange is ZERO. (Check here)                
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Auction instructions 
 
In what follows we will be conducting a series of auctions.  
 
In these auctions you will be given one good and asked how much you would be willing to pay (or 
how much you would be willing to accept) to exchange it for another good, or for one of several 
other goods.   
 
Only one auction will be binding – determined with a random draw from an envelope, and,  
Only one good will be sold – also determined with a random draw.   
 
For example, we might conduct these 2 auctions: 
Auction A: You have a Milky Way candy bar and can exchange it for a Snickers. 
Auction B: You have a Milky Way candy bar and can exchange it for a Snickers or a KitKat.   
 
If Auction B is selected, everyone will own a Milky Way, and the winning bidder(s) in that auction 
will exchange it for either a Snickers or a KitKat.     
 
In these auctions there will be 3 winning bidders.  Those top 3 bidders will pay an amount equal to 
the 4th highest bid.   
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Illustration   
 
Auction B was conducted with 7 bidders.  Participants had a Milky Way and could exchange it for a 
Snickers or a KitKat. The top 3 bidders made the exchange and paid the 4th highest bid.   
Bids for the Snickers: Let’s say that 5 of the 7 bidders preferred the Snickers to the Milky Way and 
their bids were $0.22, $0.15, $0.10, $0.05 and $0.02.  The other 2 bidders preferred the Milky Way 
and would need to be paid to exchange it for a Snickers.  Their bids were -$0.10, and -$0.20 – i.e., 
one would need to be paid $0.20 to make the exchange, the other $0.10.  Bids to exchange the 
Milky Way for the Snickers are shown below. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Bids for the KitKat: Only 1 of the 7 bidders preferred the KitKat to the Milky Way and their bid 
was $0.15. One person liked the Milky Way and KitKat equally well, so they bid zero.  The other 5 
bidders preferred Milky Way.  One bid -$0.05, two bid -$0.15, and two bid -$0.25. Bids to 
exchange the Milky Way for the KitKat are shown below. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Outcome.  Remember – only one of the two candy bars being auctioned, either the Snickers or the 
KitKat, will be selected to be sold.  If the Snickers is selected to be sold, the top 3 bidders for the 
Snickers will exchange their Milky Way for a Snickers and each would pay $0.05 (the 4th highest 
bid) for the exchange.   
 
Question:   What if the KitKat is selected to be sold?    
 
Next we will have a practice auction.  Even though it is a practice auction, there will be an actual 
payment – the winning bidders will pay money for any exchange.   
 $0.22 -$0.20 $0.02 
Amount willing-to-pay Amount willing-to-accept 
 $0.15 -$0.10  $0.10 
 -$0.25 (2) $0.00 
Amount willing-to-pay Amount willing-to-accept 
 $0.15 -$0.15 (2) 
 $0.05 
-$0.05 
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How should you bid?           
It is best to bid an amount equal to the maximum you would truly be willing to pay (WTP) for an 
exchange, or, if you prefer Milky Way, the minimum you would accept to make an exchange.   
Let’s say you prefer Snickers to Milky Way but the maximum you would pay for the exchange is 
15c.  If you bid only 5c you may lose the opportunity to make the exchange at a price you would 
have been happy to pay.  But if you bid 50c you may end up making the exchange and paying more 
than 15c.   
On the other hand, assume you prefer Milky Way to KitKat and the minimum you would accept to 
exchange the Milky Way for a KitKat is 30c.  If you bid -$1.00 you may lose the chance to make an 
exchange in which you would be happy to get 30c.  But if you bid -$0.10 you may end up making 
the exchange and receiving less than 30c.   
Let’s look at one person’s bids in the auction from the previous page.  Let’s say the person had a 
slight preference for Snickers over Milky Way and was willing-to-pay $0.02 for that exchange.  But 
they prefer Milky Way to KitKat and would need to be paid $0.05 to make that exchange.  Their 
bids would look like this: 
 
1) Snickers 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the Milky Way for the Snickers is   0.02  
OR, the minimum I would accept to exchange the Milky Way for the Snickers is     
OR, I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
2) KitKat 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the Milky Way for the KitKat is     
OR, the minimum I would accept to exchange the Milky Way for the KitKat is   0.05  
OR, I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
This person is not a top 3 bidder for the Snickers and, if Snickers is selected to be sold, will not end 
up making that exchange.  But, what if they bid 15c for the Snickers instead of the 2c they were 
truly willing to pay?  They would then make the exchange and have to pay 10c to do so – more than 
the 2c they were willing to pay.   
With a bid of -5c this person is a top 3 bidder for KitKat.  If KitKat is selected to be sold they will 
make the exchange and get paid 15c to do so (the 4th highest bid is -15c). But, what if they bid -50c 
instead of the -15c they were truly willing to accept?  Now they are no longer a top 3 bidder, and 
they lose the chance to make the exchange at what would be a favorable price.   
 
Thus, overbidding or underbidding is not in a person’s best interest in this auction.   
Before we proceed – are there any questions about this example? 
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Candy bar auction bids     I.D.  #     
    
Milky Way  Snickers, KitKat                                  
You have a Milky Way and an opportunity to exchange it for a Snickers bar or a KitKat.  The candy 
bar to be sold, either Snickers or KitKat will be determined using a random draw. The top 3 bidders 
will make an exchange, and will pay an amount equal to the 4th highest bid. A real exchange with 
payment will take place – this is not a hypothetical exercise 
Record your bids below 
 
 
1) Snickers 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the Milky Way for the Snickers is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the Milky Way for the Snickers is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
2) KitKat 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the Milky Way for the KitKat is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the Milky Way for the KitKat is   
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
Mark your bid for each candy bar on the line below. You may bid any amount. It doesn’t need 
to be one of the prices marked on the line.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 $0.25 -$0.25 $0.00 
Amount willing-to-pay Amount willing-to-accept 
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Auction 1 Instructions                                                                                         
 
Please carefully read the information provided before submitting your bids.  
You have a regular beef burger. You have an opportunity to exchange it for either: 
 
1) an irradiated beef burger,  
OR 
2)   a beef burger from animals treated with direct-fed microbials (DFM burger) 
OR 
3)   a high pressure processed beef burger (HPP burger) 
 
If this auction is selected to be binding, and if you are a winning bidder, you will end up exchanging 
the regular beef burger for one of the auctioned products. The product that will be sold (either the 
irradiated beef burger, the DFM beef burger or HPP burger) will be determined using a random 
draw.  
 
The top 3 bidders will make an exchange, and pay an amount equal to the 4th highest bid.  
 
NB: You must consume your burger to complete your participation in the experiment. 
 
 
Submit your bids on the following page.  For each of the available products, write either: 
  
a) the maximum you would pay to exchange your regular burger for the auctioned product  
OR 
b) the minimum you would accept to exchange your regular burger for the auctioned product 
OR   
c) ZERO – if you like the regular burger and the auctioned product equally well.  
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Auction 1 Bids                                                                    I.D. #     
 
1) Irradiated beef burger 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for the irradiated burger is   
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the irradiated burger is   
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
2) Burger from animals treated with direct fed microbials 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for the DFM burger is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the DFM burger is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
3) High pressure processed burger 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for the HPP burger is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the HPP burger is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
Please mark your bids for each product on the line below. You may bid any amount. It doesn’t 
need to be one of the prices marked on the line.   
 
 
 
  
  
 $1.00 -$1.00 $0.00 
Amount willing-to-pay Amount willing-to-accept 
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Information Auction      I.D. #     
 
In this auction, we will provide you an opportunity to obtain additional information about food 
irradiation. One of two types of information will be available – a pro-food irradiation perspective 
from The American Council on Science and Health or an anti-food irradiation perspective from a 
consumer advocacy group called Food and Water. 
The additional information about food irradiation will be made available in an auction. The price 
will be determined in a random draw from an envelope containing 25 price tickets.   
Participants who bid an amount equal to or greater than the randomly drawn price will pay that 
price, and will be provided with the additional information prior to submitting their next bid in the 
beef burger auction.  
Participants whose bid is less than the randomly drawn price will not obtain any additional 
information. If you purchase additional information you must not share it with other participants.   
 
Note that it is in your best interest to bid an amount equal to the true value you place on obtaining 
this information.  Overbidding your true value increases your odds of making the purchase, but 
potentially at a price above what you are truly willing-to-pay. Underbidding reduces the odds of 
making a purchase, potentially at a price that you would have been willing to pay.   
 
You can submit a bid to obtain only one type of information – either the pro-food irradiation 
information or the anti-food irradiation information. Please submit your bid for ONE TYPE OF 
INFORMATION below. 
 
 The most I am willing to pay for the Pro-Food Irradiation information is    
 
   OR 
 
 The most I am willing to pay for the Anti-Food Irradiation information is    
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Auction 2 Instructions                                                                                         
 
Please carefully read the information provided before submitting your bids.  
You have a regular beef burger. You have an opportunity to exchange it for either: 
 
2) an irradiated beef burger,  
OR 
2)   a beef burger from animals treated with direct-fed microbials (DFM burger) 
OR 
3)   a high pressure processed beef burger (HPP burger) 
 
If this auction is selected to be binding, and if you are a winning bidder, you will end up exchanging 
the regular beef burger for one of the auctioned products. The product that will be sold (either the 
irradiated beef burger, the DFM beef burger or HPP burger) will be determined using a random 
draw.  
 
The top 3 bidders will make an exchange, and pay an amount equal to the 4th highest bid.  
 
NB: You must consume your burger to complete your participation in the experiment. 
 
 
Submit your bids on the following page.  For each of the available products, write either:  
a) the maximum you would pay to exchange your regular burger for the auctioned product  
OR 
b) the minimum you would accept to exchange your regular burger for the auctioned product 
OR   
c) ZERO – if you like the regular burger and the auctioned product equally well.  
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Auction 2 Bids                                                                          I.D. #     
 
1) Irradiated beef burger 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for the irradiated burger is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the irradiated burger is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
2) Burger from animals treated with direct fed microbials 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for the DFM burger is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the DFM burger is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
3) High pressure processed burger 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for the HPP burger is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the HPP burger is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
Please mark your bids for each product on the line below. You may bid any amount. It doesn’t 
need to be one of the prices marked on the line.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 $1.00 -$1.00 $0.00 
Amount willing-to-pay Amount willing-to-accept 
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Auction 3 Instructions                                                                                        
 
Please carefully read the information provided before submitting your bids.  
You have a regular beef burger. You have an opportunity to exchange it for either: 
 
3) an irradiated beef burger,  
OR 
2)   a beef burger from animals treated with direct-fed microbials (DFM burger) 
OR 
3)   a high pressure processed beef burger (HPP burger) 
 
If this auction is selected to be binding, and if you are a winning bidder, you will end up exchanging 
the regular beef burger for one of the auctioned products. The product that will be sold (either the 
irradiated beef burger, the DFM beef burger or HPP burger) will be determined using a random 
draw.  
 
The top 3 bidders will make an exchange, and pay an amount equal to the 4th highest bid.  
 
NB: You must consume your burger to complete your participation in the experiment. 
 
 
Submit your bids on the following page.  For each of the available products, write either:  
a) the maximum you would pay to exchange your regular burger for the auctioned product  
OR 
b) the minimum you would accept to exchange your regular burger for the auctioned product 
OR   
c) ZERO – if you like the regular burger and the auctioned product equally well.  
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Auction 3 Bids                                                                           I.D. #     
 
1) Irradiated beef burger 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for the irradiated burger is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the irradiated burger is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
2) Burger from animals treated with direct fed microbials 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for the DFM burger is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the DFM burger is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
3) High pressure processed burger 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for the HPP burger is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the HPP burger is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
Please mark your bids for each product on the line below. You may bid any amount. It doesn’t 
need to be one of the prices marked on the line.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 $1.00 -$1.00 $0.00 
Amount willing-to-pay Amount willing-to-accept 
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Auction 4 Instructions                                                                                        
 
Please carefully read the information provided before submitting your bids.  
You have a regular beef burger. You now have an opportunity to exchange it for either: 
 
1) an irradiated beef burger,  
OR 
2)   a beef burger from animals treated with direct-fed microbials (DFM burger) 
OR 
3)   a high pressure processed beef burger (HPP burger) 
OR 
4)   a chicken sandwich 
 
If this auction is selected to be binding, and if you are a winning bidder, you will end up exchanging 
the regular beef burger for one of the auctioned products. The product that will be sold (either the 
irradiated beef burger, the DFM burger, the HPP burger, or the chicken sandwich) will be 
determined using a random draw.  
 
The top 3 bidders will make an exchange, and pay an amount equal to the 4th highest bid.  
 
NB: You must consume your burger to complete your participation in the experiment. 
 
 
Submit your bids on the following page.  For each of the available products, write either:  
a) the maximum you would pay to exchange your regular burger for the auctioned product  
OR 
b) the minimum you would accept to exchange your regular burger for the auctioned product 
OR   
c) ZERO – if you like the regular burger and the auctioned product equally well.  
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Auction 4 Bids                                                                     I.D. #     
 
1) Irradiated beef burger 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for the irradiated burger is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the irradiated burger is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
2) Burger from animals treated with direct fed microbials 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for the DFM burger is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the DFM burger is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
3) High pressure processed burger 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for the HPP burger is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the HPP burger is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
4) Chicken sandwich 
The most I am willing to pay to exchange the regular burger for the chicken sandwich is    
OR 
The minimum I would accept to exchange the regular burger for the chicken sandwich is    
OR 
I like both equally so my bid is ZERO. Check here.     
 
Please mark your bids for each product on the line below. You may bid any amount. It doesn’t 
need to be one of the prices marked on the line.   
 
 
 
  
 $1.00 -$1.00 $0.00 
Amount willing-to-pay Amount willing-to-accept 
